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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ANALYSIS OF CHANGE ORDERS IN
GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING WORK
AT INDOT
Introduction
There was a perception at INDOT that the number of change
orders connected with geotechnical work was excessive, and that,
as a consequence, geotechnical projects were not completed on
time or within budget. It was reported that INDOT construction
projects had in fact experienced a large increase in the number and
cost of change orders attributed to geotechnical conditions.
The only way to assess whether the number and cost of change
orders to INDOT is indeed excessive is by conducting a detailed
analysis of INDOT’s processes and procedures in the geotechnical
office, including the process of selecting code numbers that
correspond to the reasons for change orders. It is only by
understanding the reasons for change orders in each particular
case that a determination could be made on whether change
orders were preventable or not. Through this critical evaluation,
problems that need to be addressed could be identified, and
procedures or steps that should have been taken to allow
prevention or minimization of change orders could be clearly
established. This study organized the observations and information in a database. By analyzing the data collected and conducting
interviews with INDOT personnel involved with change orders,
recommendations were made to the geotechnical office for future
procedures on construction projects that will help alleviate the
problems identified.

orders (637), the occurrence of errors and omissions in geotechnical change orders is relatively low, which is a positive sign.
Most of the interviewees mentioned that they did not see
geotechnical problems as the main contributor to change orders on
INDOT projects. Though they acknowledged the fact that the
variability of soil is so great that it would be literally impossible to
eliminate geotechnical change orders, they did recognize the need to
address the following issues that lead to geotechnical change orders:
1.
2.
3.

Failure to identify areas of poor subgrade soil.
Mismatch in piling quantities.
Omissions and constructability issues associated with erosion
control work.

Implementation
This research effort was directed towards initiating the process
of identifying and addressing areas of concern that cause
geotechnical change orders frequently on INDOT projects.
Accordingly, the study provided some basic answers towards
reducing the number of geotechnical change orders. The recommendations from this study could be considered at the planning
stage of projects. With the help of the recommendations from this
study it is possible to implement a methodology towards handling
geotechnical change orders. Related studies could be conducted to
formulate a refined methodology that includes all the recommendations in a suitable manner, in order to be implemented on a
standard basis on all INDOT projects. Further research can be
undertaken on analyzing individual reasons for geotechnical
change orders to identify specific methods to avoid such issues.
Items for implementation:
1.

Findings

2.

The results of the agency survey conducted indicated that
INDOT faired medially with respect to construction costs. The
agencies provided very minimal data for change orders, and hence
it was not possible to make clear comparisons. The analysis
conducted on the data collected from 300 contracts of INDOT
revealed some useful information. The average geotechnical
change order amount per district per year was 1.34 percent of
the total estimated construction cost per district per year. The
average geotechnical change order amount per district per year
was 10.25 percent of the average amount of total change orders
per district per year. The average net overrun due to geotechnical
change orders was $707,000 per district per year. About 28 percent
(84 contracts) of the contracts that were considered in this study
experienced geotechnical change orders. In total, 158 geotechnical
change orders were recorded in all the contracts. Forty-six
contracts (out of the 84 contracts that underwent geotechnical
change orders) experienced only one geotechnical change order,
while 24 contracts experienced 2 geotechnical change orders.
About 41% of the total road contracts (155 contracts) experienced
geotechnical change orders. About 37% of the total bridge
contracts (44 contracts) experienced geotechnical change orders.
The other contract types of this study’s dataset were insignificant
as far as geotechnical change orders were concerned. Reason code
206 – Constructability: Soils-Related – was assigned to 101
geotechnical change orders. Reason code 405 – Changed Field
Conditions: Soils-Related – was assigned to 46 geotechnical
change orders. Reason code 108 – Errors and Omissions: SoilsRelated – was assigned to the 11 remaining geotechnical change
orders. When compared to the total number of items that
underwent change due to Errors and Omissions in all change

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.
10.
11.

The correct attitude of preventing change orders, rather than
dealing with them, needs to be developed among one and all.
Reason codes for every change order have to be formulated
free of ambiguity.
The geotechnical report must not only identify all problems
but should also provide a discussion of all possible solutions
to the geotechnical issues on the project.
For large projects, site investigation must be extensive and
flexible, suitable to the particular soil type/region of state, to
avoid subgrade treatment problems. In areas of problematic
soil, the preliminary investigation should be followed by a
secondary investigation with more number of boreholes.
The geotechnical engineer should coordinate with the design
and district construction personnel while making recommendations.
Change orders related to geotechnical work should be routed
through the geotechnical office so that the designer is made
aware of the occurrence and the reason for the change
orders.
Detailed constructability reviews, with the participation of
the geotechnical office, must be conducted before the letting
of major projects. Especially, traffic regulation and factors
that can affect the quality of subgrade must be assessed from
a constructability viewpoint.
Designers need to be aware of geotechnical foundation
information, especially with respect to conditions below the
subgrade so that they can include relevant items in the
contract documents.
Impact of construction traffic in urban settings, needs to be
accounted for in design.
Variation in moisture content from site investigation to
construction should be accounted for in design.
Specifications need to be evaluated for constructability,
before implementation.

Joint Transportation Research Program Technical Report FHWA/IN/JTRP-2011/08

1

12.
13.

2

Rock excavations must be accurate and the quality of rock
must be well examined.
Shelved projects need to have a secondary site investigation.
Anomalies during construction should also be sorted out
through a second site investigation, with involvement of the
geotechnical office.

14.

More attention must be focused towards determining piling
quantities accurately and suitable research could be conducted in this area.

15.

An effective software system needs to be used to record
change orders.
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CHAPTER1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
Almost all construction projects have a tendency to
change as they progress. Change is normally defined as
any event that results in a modification of the original
scope, execution time, cost, and/or quality of the work
(Ibbs et al. 2007). Accordingly, ‘‘change order’’ is the
commonly used expression to refer to any change or
variation from the original scope of work of the
construction contract. A change order: 1) increases or
decreases the scope of work, 2) changes specifications
of the character or quality of the material, and/or 3)
changes the level, position, or dimension of any part in
the original contract of scope of work (Civitello 1987).
Change orders may occur frequently on construction
projects for various reasons: 1) unexpected and
unpredictable site conditions, 2) inadequate site investigation, 3) design errors, 4) weather conditions, 5)
increases in project scope, and 6) other project changes.
These factors have been known to affect the construction process in many ways depending on the contract
type. According to Thomas et al. (1995) and Hanna et
al. (1999), change orders typically tend to increase costs
by extending the project duration or delaying the
project process, and often cause labor productivity
losses or significant inefficiency.
Change orders represent a cost to the State and to tax
payers that is real and often extremely large because
contractors tend to charge very large amounts to any
additional work that deviates from the work that was
originally planned. It is estimated that the United States
construction industry spends $13,26 billion each year for
construction change orders (Ibbs et al. 1998). The total
cost of project change could reach $60 billion annually
with additional financial resources spent on claims and
legal disputes (Ibbs et al. 1998). Therefore, efforts must be
made to reduce significantly the occurrence of change
orders in order to provide significant cost savings to the
state of Indiana and save taxpayer dollars.
The proposed research, in this context, developed a
set of guidelines that will allow the geotechnical office
of the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT)
to minimize the probabilities of having change orders in
those projects where they are truly preventable. These
guidelines include not only recommendations on how
to manage the problem of change orders associated
with the geotechnical construction projects when they
are unavoidable but also general recommendations for
adequate site investigation, design procedures, and
quality assurance and quality control (QA/QC) processes that could help minimize change orders. The
main benefit from the present study is to provide cost
savings to the State of Indiana by reducing the
occurrence of geotechnical change orders.
1.2. Problem Statement
There was a perception at INDOT that the number
of change orders connected with geotechnical work was

excessive, and that, as a consequence, geotechnical
projects were not completed on time or within budget.
It was reported that INDOT construction projects had
in fact experienced a large increase in the number and
cost of change orders attributed to geotechnical
conditions.
The only way to assess whether the number and cost
of change orders to INDOT is indeed excessive is by
conducting a detailed analysis of INDOT’s processes
and procedures in the geotechnical office, including the
process of selecting code numbers that correspond to
the reasons for change orders. It is only by understanding the reasons for change orders in each
particular case that a determination could be made on
whether change orders were preventable or not.
Through this critical evaluation, problems that need
to be addressed could be identified and procedures or
steps that should have been taken to allow prevention
or minimization of change orders could be clearly
established. By organizing these observations and
information in a database and by analyzing the data
collected, recommendations could be made to the
geotechnical office for future procedures on construction projects that will help alleviate the problems
identified. This is what was done in this project.
1.3. Study Objectives
The main objective of the proposed research was to
develop guidelines and to provide recommendations for
minimizing the number of change orders related to
geotechnical work at INDOT. Change orders related to
geotechnical work for projects completed in the last 5
years were investigated and a database was compiled
containing causes and effects of change orders for each
project considered. The detailed goals of this research
were as follows:
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

Collect and compile information on change orders for
projects completed in the last 5 years that are directly
related to work in the geotechnical field (information on
the causes of these change orders are carefully evaluated).
Interview those who were involved in the projects in
order to clarify specific details about each case.
Review the geotechnical work (site investigation,
approaches used for treatment of ‘‘wet’’ or soft subgrade
soils, foundation design, appropriateness of design
methods, and QA/QC procedures) done based on the
information provided by INDOT engineers during
interviews on the causes of change orders in INDOT
construction projects.
Prepare a database containing all geotechnical change
orders in the last 5 years, and their causes. The database
was organized by fields that included the number of
change orders per project, construction cost, type of
geotechnical work, geotechnical change order amounts
and contract type.
Develop a set of guidelines for minimizing and reducing
the occurrence of change orders caused by geotechnical
conditions. The guidelines are comprehensive and
focused on INDOT procedures and processes, and as a
result they are also useful to contractors and owners
trying to manage change better. The guidelines were
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developed based on change orders in which a different
approach to the geotechnical work would have prevented
the change order or those in which a bureaucratic or
process-related reason is apparent.

1.4. Scope of the Study
In order to accomplish the objectives of this research,
several tasks were identified. The detailed scope of this
research is as follows:
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Perform literature review.
Compile the information available on each project for
which there were change orders in the last 5 years directly
related to work done by the geotechnical office (the
information was organized by fields that included the
number of change orders per project, construction cost,
type of geotechnical work, project duration, and contract
type).
Perform in-depth interviews with those who were
involved in geotechnical change orders in the last 5 years
to clarify or confirm details.
Review the geotechnical work (site investigation, foundation design, design methods used, QA/QC procedures
used, and geotechnical construction procedures) related
to change orders in INDOT construction projects.
Prepare a database containing change orders in the
geotechnical office at INDOT in the last 5 years, their
causes, and a final assessment on change orders
preventability. Perform statistical analyses whenever
possible for identifying the factors that have a significant
influence on change orders in the geotechnical work done
by INDOT.
Develop a set of guidelines and recommendations for the
geotechnical office that will help minimize change orders
and mitigate the impact of project changes in the future.

1.5. Report Organization
Chapter 1 of this report provides an overview of the
situation at INDOT and the need for analyzing the
occurrence of geotechnical change orders in INDOT
construction projects. Also in Chapter 1, the objective
of the study and its scope are described. In Chapter 2
the existing literature regarding change order and
geotechnical change order occurrences are discussed.
Some of the relevant results from previous studies are
presented and discussed in the context of the data
collected for this project. Chapter 3 presents the results
from an agency survey aimed at understanding the
causes of geotechnical change orders in other states.
Chapter 4 presents the study approach and the framework for the analysis of the data collected. Chapter 5
describes the data collection process and the organization of the data into a form, such that it serves the
purpose of this study. Chapter 6 provides the descriptive statistics from the data collected to elaborate on
construction contract costs and geotechnical change
orders. Chapter 7 presents the analyses performed on
the data and the results from them. Chapter 8 quotes
the information obtained from interviews performed
4

with personnel associated with geotechnical change
orders at INDOT. Chapter 9 provides a summary of
the findings from the study. Chapter 10 presents the
recommendations and discusses their implementation.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction
This chapter includes a review of the identified
literature on change orders, pertaining to geotechnical
work. We also describe the many reasons for the
occurrence of change orders and the methods used to
manage or avoid change orders. A brief discussion of
the most relevant studies and their findings are included
in this chapter.
2.2. Prime Reasons for Change Orders
In general, the occurrence of change orders implies
that there are certain issues in the project which have
not followed their planned course (Rowland 1981).
Considering the dynamic nature of construction projects, it would be impossible to eliminate the occurrence
of change orders. There are very few projects that are
completed without change orders. Thus, a reasonable
objective for a project is to reduce the number of
change orders and to manage changes more efficiently.
According to Bordat et al. (2004), change orders may
result in extra work that needs to be performed or in
additional work to be carried out. Extra work was
defined as work that need not necessarily affect project
completion and that may not even feature as a part of
the contract. Additional work, however, was defined as
work that is caused by errors in planning and design,
change in the scope of work or variation between
estimated and actually required quantities. In order to
reduce or prevent change orders in future projects, its
causes need to be clearly identified.
With respect to specific reasons for change orders
and influential factors, Rowland (1981) studied the data
from 18 construction contracts. He concluded that
contract size was a key factor that influenced the
occurrence of change orders. According to Rowland
(1981), an increase in the size of a contract, increased
the change order rate. This conforms to the general idea
that the complexity of a project increases with increases
in project size, which in turn increases the change order
rate. Rowland (1981) also suggests that in the case of
larger projects, the length of the communication
channel increases, leading to higher number of change
orders due to shortcomings in transfer of information.
Rowland (1981) also indicated through his research, the
dependence of the number of change orders on the
value of the lowest bid and the second lowest bid;
the number of change orders rose when the winning bid
was less than the government estimate.
Jacoby (2001) in alliance with FHWA, researched
construction contract change orders. The study, which
was completed in 2001, included 74 contracts that bore
a cost greater than $10 million and cost overruns higher
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assessed with the data collected during site investigation.
The greater the completeness of the site investigation
program, the better the estimation of quantities on the
plan and design stage and, the better the concurrence
with actual quantities used for construction. Hence, a
thorough site investigation program would ensure that
the project sees fewer changes and change orders.
The failure to predict geological conditions and
related geotechnical problems are prominent contributors to cost and schedule overruns on construction
projects (Hoek and Palmeiri 1998). Cost and schedule
overruns are mostly related to change orders in
construction projects. Though attempts have been
made to include contractual clauses to minimize overruns due to geological conditions, these efforts have
proven to be futile in many cases. Thus, it is most
profitable to be able to foresee these geological
problems before hand. If all conditions could be
foreseen and if design could cater to all the necessities,
we would not have a necessity to change the course of
the drafted plan. But the basic problem faced by a
designer is the inadequacy of the information from the
site investigation program.
In 1984, the U.S National Committee on Tunnel
Technology (USNCTT) collected data from 84 tunnel
projects and analyzed the influence of extent of site
investigation on the cost increase in projects. Fig 2.1
shows the variation of cost versus the ratio of
exploration borehole length to the length of the tunnel.
From this plot it is evident that insufficient borehole
drilling was directly related to cost increases. This can
be clearly attributed to the inadequacy in the geological
information at hand used to predict possible problems
that may be encountered.
In the above case, tunnel projects were chosen.
Obviously, the spacing of the boreholes along the
length of the tunnel is also an important factor that
needs to be accounted for because when widely spaced

than 25% of the estimated contract cost. From the
study, certain problems were identified to be the major
reasons for the occurrence of change orders. These are
listed in Table 2.1.
Observing the frequency of these reasons, the most
common reason for the occurrence of change orders
was found to be low engineer’s estimate for the total
construction project cost. Also, ‘‘differing site conditions – geotechnical issues (hazardous waste, soil
excavation, additional shoulder rehabilitation required,
additional pavement patching)’’ was a reason for
change orders in 20 of the projects. This reason seemed
to be one of the prime reasons for the occurrence of
change orders. Since the change orders due to
geotechnical issues are very relevant to the current
research, we shall further elaborate on the literature
pertinent to differing site conditions and also view some
other reasons for change orders involving geotechnical
work. The next section narrows down on the reasons
that cause geotechnical change orders.
2.3. Geotechnical Reasons for Change Orders
A very broad view of the reasons for change orders
was provided in the previous section. These issues
might affect geotechnical work as much as any other
type of work in construction. The focus of this study
being to examine geotechnical reasons leading to
change orders, it is necessary to understand the main
geotechnical issues that are responsible for the occurrence of change orders.
2.3.1. Site Investigation
An effective site investigation program is of major
significance in order to obtain all the necessary
information required for construction on the field. The
stability of pavements, slopes and foundations can be

TABLE 2.1
Reasons for Change Orders Identified by FHWA

Reason

Number
of Projects

Packaging of project
1
Design revisions between FHWA approval and actual advertisement 6
Engineer’s estimate was low/bid’s high
27

Differing site conditions – geotechnical issues (hazardous waste,
muck excavation, additional shoulder rehab required, additional
pavement patching)
Environmental and legal injunction with construction delay costs
Low design-build estimates
Delays/accelerated roadway openings or work in general
Design issues corresponds to construction changes
Payment of incentives
Construction changes and miscellaneous or no reasons cited
Work zone traffic control

20

1
3
10
5
2
13
1

Remarks
Project bundled with another
3 Projects in one state
Some fuel price adjustments, 1 project cited market
conditions, some citations that size of project or uniqueness of
work affected bid prices or state’s ability to estimate project
-

Omissions, issues that carried over to construction
Minor scope changes or additional work orders

Source: Jacoby 2001
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Figure 2.1

Variation of contract costs as a function of the length of exploration boreholes drilled (Source: USNCTT 1984)

boreholes are used, there is the need to interpolate the
results between the boreholes. Basically, the geotechnical parameters evaluated at adjacent boreholes would
have to be interpolated and in the case of excessive
intermediate spacing, the interpolation will result in
inaccurate data, which leads to surprises during
construction and consequent change orders and cost
overruns.
From this discussion it would be appropriate to state
that site investigation inadequacies would increasingly
affect projects that span several miles in length – long
tunnels, long dams and more pertinently, highways.
We have seen unaddressed and unexpected site
conditions as a reason for cost overruns and change
orders. The next section discusses some of the other
causes for change orders in geotechnical work.

3.

a.

Analytical - caused by the choice of an unreasonable
analytical model.
b. Properties - caused by the choice of unreasonable
design values.
c. Geological – caused by unforeseeable, inherently
hazardous or unforeseen ground conditions.
d. Errors in geotechnical design are another major
cause for change orders. Trenter (2003) attributed
geotechnical design risks on a construction project to
three types of uncertainty, which coincide with the
‘‘Technical Risk’’ defined by Baynes (2010):
1.
2.

2.3.2. Other Causes for Geotechnical Change Orders
Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘‘risk’’ as a
situation which has a possibility of loss. Considering
that change orders invariably result in an increase in
construction cost and result in losses, any situation that
can potentially lead to change orders can be referred to
as a risk. Apart from unexpected site conditions, there
could be other sources of geotechnical risks which lead
to change orders. Some of these reasons may also be
relevant to change orders involving any type of
construction work.
Baynes (2010) classified the various types of geotechnical risks into the following categories:
1.

2.

6

Project Management Risk – caused by the poor management of the geo-engineering process due to lack of
sufficient knowledge about the significance of ground
conditions.
Contractual Risk – caused by poor management of site
investigation and contract documentation due to lack of

knowledge about the significance of the ground conditions.
Technical Risk

3.

Design risks from uncertainty associated with geological
issues.
Design risks due to uncertainty arising from the
appropriateness of engineering analysis or the lack of it.
Risks associated with the reliability and representability
of the engineering properties used in geotechnical design.
The Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD)
started a program in 2000 in order to construct over 150
new schools with a total construction cost of $1.5 billion.
After the design phase of the project, the management
sought to conduct a constructability review to mitigate
further changes during the project. Pruett (2009)
discussed the outcome and lessons from the constructability review conducted on this program. General
statements about recommendations made in the geotechnical report used for the above mentioned project,
were often found to be in conflict with the information
provided in the earthwork specifications (Pruett 2009).
The author also indicates the disregard for the change in
conditions that occurred from the time of site investigation to the time of construction. In case of ‘‘performance’’
specification, it was seen that sometimes the designer
placed the design-build responsibility on the contractor.
When this was not clearly specified on the contract
documents, it led to gaps in scope of work (Pruett 2009).
These were some of the most relevant findings from the
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constructability review conducted in the LAUSD program.

Having seen the various causes for geotechnical
change orders, we will now look at some of the ways
prescribed for preventing these change orders, as
described in the literature.
2.4. Preventing Geotechnical Surprises
Considering the importance of site investigation, it
would be obvious to conclude that a lot of time, effort
and finances need to be concentrated there. However, a
balance needs to be struck in determining the extent of
site investigation. For example, the number of boreholes per unit length of the project needs to be
determined. On a project of vast linear extent, it would
be impossible to space holes very closely, as the costs
would run very high. Even if boreholes were closely
spaced, there would be no assurance that the entire soil
profile would have been perfectly determined and there
would still be opportunities for geotechnical surprises.
The next few sections discuss the approaches used in
site investigation, as described in the literature, which
may be helpful in establishing a balance between the
resources spent through site investigation and the losses
prevented by it.
Hoek and Palmeiri (1998) suggested methods to
predict problematic geological conditions that when
used have the potential to minimize cost overruns and
change order occurrence. A brief description on their
study and their prescriptions is presented here. One of
the ways of avoiding unexpected geological and
geotechnical issues, as suggested by them, is by using
available local geological knowledge.
In all developed and in many developing countries,
there are geological agencies which have accumulated
information over the years and have data which reflect
site conditions to a large extent. Thus, it is only obvious
that construction projects should try to make use of the
data collected by these agencies that have done extensive
surveying over a number of years. Sometimes certain
site locations are investigated as part of national
development plans. In these well-investigated sites, only
a small amount of additional data may be enough to set
up design plans for certain projects.
In the absence of national plans or information
available with national agencies, certain local universities
and government mining departments are bound to have
enough information on the local geology. It would be
worth making an attempt to find such sources of
information.
In case of dearth of such local knowledge, it is
absolutely necessary to have a thorough geotechnical
site investigation program that would allow an appropriate understanding of the soil conditions. Also,
employing geotechnical experts with experience to carry
out such site investigation is crucial to the success of the
program itself (Hoek and Palmeiri 1998). In this regard,

Professor Ralph Peck was quoted saying the following
words of wisdom:
Nature did not follow standards in creating the mass of
rock or soil in question. A defect or a field condition
potentially fatal to the performance of the project may
exist that escapes the standard investigation. Experience
leading to judgment is the best defense against the
consequences of such a possibility, and the course of
action leading to an appropriate solution will differ
amongst individuals of different experience. That is,
judgment is an essential ingredient in geo-engineering,
and it cannot be standardized.
Having already seen the importance of a sound site
investigation program in minimizing change orders, we
will now look into some of the ways and means to
improve the quality of a site investigation program.
2.4.1. Advanced Methods to Enhance Site Investigation
The following are some methods described in detail
in the literature that can be used to enhance a site
investigation program:
1.

Use of geophysical techniques like seismic reflection/
refraction and mobile geophysical technology:
Geophysical techniques are not replacements for traditional techniques, such as surface mapping, as primary
site investigation tools. Seismic reflection or similar
methods are of use when it comes to demarcating
boundaries between weathered deposits closer to the
surface and deeper bedrock. Cross-hole seismic techniques and tomography – imaging by sections through
penetration of any kind of wave – are extremely useful
tools for interpolating results between boreholes and for
determining lithological boundaries (Hoek and Palmeiri
1998). However, the scope of geophysical techniques on a
project, based on whether there are clear boundaries that
the techniques can identify, should be assessed before
their use at the site under consideration.

2.

Mobile geophysical techniques have a much wider range
of applications than hand-held devices. In the case of
hand-held devices used for geophysical techniques, the
speed of data collection is very low and the data obtained
is also sparse. Surface surveys can be carried out at a rapid
pace with the use of mobile geophysical techniques that
also produce dense datasets. Such data can be utilized to
intelligently optimize the use of traditional drilling,
through targeted and data-based subsurface exploration
(Lopez 2006). Mobility and continuity in data acquisition
are attributes that enable coverage of entire project area
economically, ensuring that subsurface conditions are
adequately assessed before construction.
Increased presentation of geotechnical information using
3-D modeling techniques (Hoek and Palmeiri 1998):
Presentation of geotechnical information in three dimensions will considerably enhance the understanding of site
conditions and, hence, help the designer to deliver more
accurate designs and quantities that coincide with actual
requirements during construction. Use of such technology is more widespread in the mining industry. Adoption
of such techniques from the mining industry would help
in enhancing the quality of geotechnical site investigation.
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Despite recent developments in site investigation, the risk
of changes will never be completely eliminated considering the random nature of soil. Thus, construction project
contracts must address these risks effectively. The next
section discusses contractual arrangements that help in
managing these risks and, hence, aid in managing change
orders better.

2.4.2. Contractual Arrangements to Manage
Geotechnical risks
While the significance of the site investigation
program was discussed, it was also seen that geotechnical risks tend to prevail despite robust site investigation.
Moreover, considering the increasing emphasis on cost
cutting measures and taking into account practical
considerations, site investigation is bound to be an area
of compromise. This makes it very essential to manage
the risk of geotechnical surprises, with the help of
contractual agreements.
The American Society of Civil Engineers (1997)
prescribes that the risks associated with geological and
geotechnical issues be reduced by:
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

Allocating an appropriate budget for obtaining subsurface information.
Employing or retaining experts who can evaluate the
risks involved, prepare drawings and specifications, and
also deliver a ‘‘Geotechnical Baseline Report (GBR)’’
that accounts for the risks involved. A GBR is a report
that portrays a realistic interpretation of the subsurface
conditions that are anticipated in the proposed construction, including the mean and expected variances of the
prevailing geotechnical conditions (Smith 2001).
Preparing the Geotechnical Baseline Report by allocating
ample time and financial resources to it and ensuring that
it is consistent with other design documents.
Forming unit price payment provisions, keeping in mind
that they need to be adjustable to varying conditions.
Reviewing and discussing thoroughly with bidders, the
appropriateness of the bid, before it is submitted.
Reserving funds as a buffer depending on the gauged risk
level on a project.

Implementation of such contractual agreements
should help in managing risks to a great extent. This
would be an effective way to handle the threat of
change orders, geotechnical and others, on any
construction project.
Other methods that are generally prescribed to
control geotechnical change orders are:
1.

2.

3.
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Using ‘‘risk registers’’ for complete management of the
geotechnical risks (Clayton 2001, Trenter 2003). Risk
registers are documents that contain information on all
the identified risks, their possible impact, probabilities of
occurrence, planned responses when these are encountered and techniques to mitigate them.
Using various kinds of reports to methodically convey
the results of the site investigation to the contractor
(Knill 2003, Van Staveren & Knoeff 2004)
Having flexibility in the contract that allows the
contractor to be paid for work that needs to be done
(Fookes et al. 2000, Clayton 2001)

4.

Using a contract that allocates the geotechnical risk,
more or less equally, between the owner and the
contractor (Eddleston et al. 1995)

Contractual arrangements, like the ones described
above, help in addressing the various risks involved with
geotechnical work on a construction project. Through
the above methods, it can be ensured that there is a
complete awareness and preparedness towards the risks
associated with a project and that the aftermath of the
risks, if encountered, is not concentrated just on the
owner or the contractor, but equally divided among
them. Apart from sharing risks and responsibilities, a
contract document should act as a unifying force that ties
both sides to a common objective, and the terms of the
contract should primarily address that common objective. A strong contract document that clearly defines and
identifies all the risks associated with the project, should
go a long way in preventing change orders and resulting
disputes that occur during the construction phase.
2.5. Summary
In this chapter we looked at the various studies that
dealt with the problem of geotechnical change orders. The
literature review identified the typical reasons, on a broad
scale, that cause geotechnical change orders on construction projects and offered some suggestions to prevent or
manage these changes in a cost-effective manner.
CHAPTER 3. AGENCY SURVEY
3.1. Introduction
An agency survey was carried out to obtain contract
cost and geotechnical change order information from
various states in the United States of America. The
survey was motivated by similar efforts from Jacoby
(2001) and Bordat et al. (2004) where information was
collected from various DOTs. The agency survey on
this research was conducted to form a basis of
comparison with the change order data of Indiana
and to gauge the relative standing of INDOT with
regard to annual contract costs and geotechnical
change orders. Also, data and information obtained
regarding geotechnical reasons for change orders could
then be compared to those provided in the literature
review. An e-mail solicitation was distributed to all the
50 DOTs. The following information was requested:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The total annual construction cost
The total annual construction cost for geotechnical work
The total annual geotechnical change order cost
The major causes for the occurrence of geotechnical
change orders

The above information was requested for each of the
years in the period between 2003 to 2007. Replies were
received from 8 states, which provided answers for
some or all four of the above points, providing
complete or partial data. This chapter presents and
discusses the information received from these states.
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TABLE 3.1
Requested information from California: 2003–2007
Question
Total construction cost
Total construction cost for geotechnical work
Total cost of geotechnical change orders
Benicia (Contract 04-006034)

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

$ 590.6
$ 177.2
$ 34.1
$0

$ 1,574.7
$ 472.4
$ 8.7
$ 61.0

$ 342.4
$ 102.7
$ 17.1
$ 8.5

$ 470.1
$ 141.03
$ 26.0
$ 135.2

$ 642.5
$ 192.75
$ 16.2
$ 16.7

*

All values in millions of dollars.

3.2. Contract Cost and Change Order Information:
Results of Agency Survey
Eight states responded with information to our email questionnaire – California, Georgia, Kansas,
Kentucky, New Hampshire, Ohio, Virginia and
Wisconsin.
The respondent from California provided the following data regarding the annual contract costs and
geotechnical change orders amounts for the years
2003–2007, as shown in Table 3.1. It can be seen that
the total construction cost was considerably more for
the year 2006, as was the total geotechnical construction cost. However, the geotechnical change order cost
was the greatest for the year 2007, at 34.1 million. The
respondent separated the data for the city of Benicia in
California, as recorded on the respondent’s database.
Fig. 3.1 shows the variation of total annual contract
cost, cost for geotechnical work (geo-items) and the
geotechnical change order cost for 2003–2007 in the
state of California.
The geotechnical change order amounts expressed as
a percentage of the total construction cost for
geotechnical work was seen to be highest for the year

of 2007 (Fig. 3.2). The trend in change orders (as
discussed in the literature) - change order amount
increases with increases in construction cost - was not
reflected in the data provided by the state of California.
The occurrence of geotechnical change orders was
greater in 2007 even though the geotechnical construction cost and the total construction cost were greater
for the year 2006. The variation of geotechnical change
orders as a percentage of the total construction cost and
geotechnical construction cost is shown in Fig. 3.2.
As part of the survey, the agencies were also
requested to list the main causes for geotechnical
change orders in their state, as observed in their
experience. The respondent from California provided
the following reasons to be among the chief causes for
geotechnical change orders in the state:
1.
2.
3.

Man-made buried object
Differing site conditions
Design change (Examples: revised pile tip, revised pile
type, revised pile size, revised footing dimension)

These reasons are very similar to the reasons
discussed in the literature, which generally lead to
geotechnical change orders.

Figure 3.1 Variation of total construction cost, construction cost for geotechnical work, and geotechnical change order
amounts for 2003–2007, California
Joint Transportation Research Program Technical Report FHWA/IN/JTRP-2011/08
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Figure 3.2 Variation of geo change orders as a percentage of total construction cost, geotechnical construction cost between
2003 and 2007, California

As mentioned previously, some of the states provided
incomplete data in the reply to the information
requested. The respondent from the state of Georgia
replied with only the contract cost information for
contracts in Georgia in the period between the years
2003 and 2007 (Table 3.2).
The respondent from the state of Kansas provided a
more qualitative reply to the questions and did not
respond with much of numerical data. In his reply, the
respondent claimed that on projects where KDOT did
the geotechnical work, the geotechnical change orders
were 0 percent. On projects where geotechnical
consultants from outside KDOT did the work, about
30 percent of the projects had change orders associated
with geotechnical work, stated the respondent. Also,
the reply mentioned that on an average, geotechnical
change orders summed up to about $ 3 million, out of a
$ 400 million construction budget. The respondent
from Kansas also mentioned that though the change
order rate was generally low, when they occurred, they
tended to be very expensive.
The Kansas state reply stated that the main cause for
geotechnical change orders, on their construction
projects, was poor work from geotechnical consultants.
Thus errors in design seemed to be the major issue, as
far as geotechnical change orders in the construction
projects of Kansas were considered. Though not much
TABLE 3.2
Annual Construction Cost for Georgia: 2003–2007
Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

10

data was provided, the qualitative replies help in
forming some idea about the geotechnical change order
scene in the state of Kansas.
The respondent from Kentucky provided partial data
for the annual construction costs for the projects in that
state. Annual construction costs were provided for the
years 2006 and 2007 (Table 3.3).
The main reasons for geotechnical change orders in
Kentucky were stated to be:
1.

2.

3.

Unexpected Site Conditions: Natural wet weather springs
that were not detected during the site investigation,
caused several minor landslides and settlement issues.
Unexpected Site Conditions: Varying rockline and
fractures in the rock mass -Kentucky has several areas
of karst that caused many problems during construction.
Also, Kentucky has several areas with large rock cuts and,
hence, unexpected fractures and joints caused problems.
Design Errors: Kentucky had fast-tracked several
projects during the 6–7 years between 2002 and 2006,
2007. Several of the projects did not get as much review
during the design phase as in the past and, as a result,
more omissions and small errors slipped through.
These reasons, again, corroborate the claims from the
literature that insufficient site investigation and design
errors contribute majorly to the occurrence of geotechnical change orders.
The state of New Hampshire provided the data shown in
Table 3.4. It can be seen from the data in Table 3.4 that
the construction costs are evidently less than that
compared to say, California. Understandably, the geotechnical change order costs are also correspondingly
very much less or zero.

Total Annual Construction Cost
$ 740,409,700
$ 911,220,000
$ 1,143,000,000
$ 2,197,000,000
$ 2,656,300,000

TABLE 3.3
Annual Contract Cost for 2006 and 2007
Question
Total construction cost

2007

2006

$1,543,443,088

$1,030,028,000
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TABLE 3.4
Requested Data from New Hampshire: 2003–2007
Question
Total construction cost
Total construction cost for
geotechnical work
Total cost of geo-co

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

$96,798,300
$1,519,200

$133,142,500
$889,100

$133,737,700
$2,685,700

$112,965,900
$1,528,300

$119,284,900
$2,154,100

$0

$0

$0

$12,200

$78,300

Fig. 3.3 shows the variation of annual construction
cost and geotechnical construction cost across the years
2003–2007, New Hampshire.
The main reason for geotechnical change orders in
construction contracts in New Hampshire was quoted
to be unexpected site conditions that were encountered
on the field.
The data from the state of Ohio is shown in Table.
3.5. The year with highest construction cost, 2005, was
also the year with the highest amount of geotechnical
change orders. However, the geotechnical change
order amounts as a percentage of the total construction cost was highest for the year 2003. This again
does not necessarily conform to the trend discussed in
the literature, where construction costs have been

Figure 3.3

identified to be an influential factor on change order
amounts.
The annual construction costs in the state of Ohio for
the years 2003–2007, varied as shown in Fig. 3.4. Also
shown are the total construction cost for geotechnical
work (geo -items) and the geotechnical change order
amounts. Fig. 3.5 shows the variation of the geotechnical change order amounts expressed as a percentage of
the total annual construction costs and as a percentage
of geotechnical construction cost for 2003–2007.
The respondent from the state of Virginia did not
provide any data for the construction costs or change
orders. However, he provided the major two reasons
for the occurrence of change orders in geotechnical
work for construction contracts in the state of Virginia:

Variation of total construction cost and geotechnical construction cost in New Hampshire: 2003–2007

TABLE 3.5
Requested Data from Ohio: 2003–2007
Question
Total construction cost (millions of dollars)
Total construction cost for geotechnical work (millions of dollars)
Total cost of geotechnical change orders (millions of dollars)

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

1,210
101
18.2

1,560
69
8

1,170
130
17.90

1,130
80
31.3

920
84
40.5

Joint Transportation Research Program Technical Report FHWA/IN/JTRP-2011/08

11

Figure 3.4 Variation annual construction cost, geotechnical construction cost and geotechnical change order amounts for
2003–2007, Ohio

Figure 3.5 Variation of geotechnical change order amounts as a percentage of total construction costs and geotechnical
construction costs between 2003 and 2007: Ohio
1.
2.

Occurrence of unsuitable materials and their undercutting
Contract items ( pay items and quantities )

Again, these two reasons point at improper site
investigation and design errors.
The respondent from Wisconsin provided the data
for the annual construction costs for 2005–2007 (Table.
3.6) but there was no information on geotechnical work
in the state.
12

The main reasons for occurrence of geotechnical
change orders in construction contracts in the state of
Wisconsin are:
TABLE 3.6
Annual Construction Costs in Wisconsin: 2005–2007
Question
Total construction cost

2007

2006

2005

$725,000,000 $715,000,000 $715,000,000
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TABLE 3.7
Data from Indiana States with district-wise split: 2003–2007
Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Average

Total construction cost for Indiana

Crawfordsville

FortWayne

Greenfield

$485,076,967
$666,372,736
$756,216,354
$635,789,041
$695,204,894
$647,731,998

$15,067,837
$36,391,559
$63,496,574
$70,763,194
$49,876,534
$47,119,140

$61,599,742
$117,844,773
$67,021,701
$132,215,237
$52,152,381
$86,166,767

$146,222,558
$213,946,865
$261,900,815
$250,471,375
$150,415,505
$204,591,424

Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Average

1.

2.
3.

LaPorte

Seymour

Vincennes

$135,430,544
$119,838,736
$131,971,540
$26,586,361
$146,762,935
$112,118,023

$70,274,216
$102,051,125
$153,647,239
$58,472,606
$57,481,395
$88,385,316

$56,482,070
$76,299,678
$78,178,484
$97,280,267
$238,516,144
$109,351,329

Unexpected site conditions and conditions that change
from the time of site investigation to the time of
construction
Misinterpretation and misunderstanding of specifications
Design changes

Table 3.7 shows the data for the annual construction
costs in the state of Indiana and also gives the split
among the six districts in the state.
Combining all the data from the states, Fig. 3.6
shows the variation of annual construction costs for
2003–2007 of each of the states that turned in
considerable amount of data. It is clear that Georgia
is ahead in terms of the annual construction cost.
Indiana has comparable construction costs with the
state of Wisconsin.

Figure 3.6

3.3. Summary
Though the response from the DOTs around the
country was very minimal, the agency survey provided
some useful information on the trends of the construction costs in some of the states and how they compared
to Indiana. Also, more crucially, some main causes for
the occurrence of geotechnical change orders in these
states were identified. The most common causes were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Unexpected site conditions due to insufficient site
investigation
Design changes and errors
Change in field conditions
Man-made buried objects
Contract items – payments and quantities

Comparison of annual construction costs between states for 2003–2007
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The agency survey gives us a preview into some of the
reasons that may be causing geotechnical change orders
in INDOT projects and also gives a basis of comparison
for the data from construction contracts in Indiana,
which is discussed in the next chapters.

CHAPTER 4. STUDY METHODOLOGY AND
DATABASE FORMATION
4.1. Introduction

considered. The top ten contracts, in terms of the
estimated total construction cost, from each year from
each district were selected. Hence, the dataset included
ten contracts from each of the five years between 2003
and 2007, from each of the six districts in Indiana. In
all, data from 300 contracts were part of the database.
In the next section, we will look into the processes and
the rationale behind the development of the dataset.
4.3.1. Collection of Material

In order to investigate the occurrence of geotechnical
change orders in Indiana, a method of study was
established to work within the limits of data availability. This chapter discusses the method of study that
was adopted to investigate the causes of change orders
in geotechnical work in INDOT projects. The collection
of data, the form of its availability, the process of
sorting of the data, its presentation and the analysis
performed on the data are described in this chapter.
4.2. Method of Study

As mentioned earlier in Section 4.2, six districts were
chosen from the state of Indiana. The contract
documents of each of the 300 contracts (50 from each
district) were collected from the district offices of
INDOT. For this study, the six districts that were
considered are Crawfordsville, Fort Wayne, Greenfield,
LaPorte, Seymour and Vincennes. Figure 4.1 shows the
geographic location of the six districts.
The contract documents typically contained the
following relevant information:

The following sequence of steps was adopted as part
of the methodology for analyzing the change orders in
geotechnical work at INDOT:
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

Six districts of Indiana were chosen based on similar
analysis of change orders at INDOT, previously performed by Bordat et.al (2004).
Material related to change orders in INDOT projects was
collected from the district offices of INDOT.
Data relevant to the change orders in geotechnical work
was selected from the material collected in step (1).
The data from step (2) was then sorted out into a
meaningful and presentable form to create the database
of geotechnical change order information.
Descriptive statistics were used to represent the data in a
tangible manner, from which conclusions could be drawn
regarding the change order trends and reasons for
occurrence.
Interviews were conducted with some of the project
engineers and geotechnical consultants who were
involved in the geotechnical work and the associated
change orders in some of the projects that were part of
the database.
Results and inferences were obtained from the descriptive statistics and the interviews performed.
Recommendations were formulated based on the data
collected to help INDOT minimize the problem of
geotechnical change orders.

4.3. Database Formation
As described in the methodology section above, this
study began with the collection of data from district
offices of INDOT and further processing of the data
into an appropriate form. In accordance with the study
objectives, this study used the data from certain
INDOT contracts that were completed in the five years
between 2003 and 2007. These contracts essentially had
end dates which fell in the five years that were
14

Figure 4.1 Highway Administrative Districts in Indiana
(Bordat et.al 2004)
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1.

A brief description of the change orders that occurred on
the project:
This includes a few lines of information as to what
caused the change order and what work was being
carried out that had not been planned earlier.

2.

The reason code assigned to each of the change orders:
Every change order was assigned with a particular reason
code, according to the standard reason codes followed in
INDOT contracts; this is explained in detail in Sections
4.3.2 and 4.3.3.

3.

The amount involved in the change orders in U.S.
Dollars.

In addition to the estimated total construction costs
for the projects selected, the above three bits of
information were collected from each of the 300
contract documents and stored in Microsoft Excel
Spreadsheets.
4.3.2. Change Order Policy and Reason Codes
at INDOT
We have already seen from the literature review in
Chapter 2 and the Agency Survey in Chapter 3 that
change orders occur as a result of factors such as
unexpected changes in field conditions, changes in
project scope and design errors. But all changes are not
recorded as change orders. This section describes the
change order policy and reason codes that are followed
in INDOT contracts. INDOT’s ‘‘Policy for Construction
Change Orders on Highway Construction Contracts’’
(refer Appendix) defines the circumstances for recording
change orders and also prescribes reason codes that need
to be attributed to these. This enables us to understand
better the circumstances that warrant recording of
change orders and the possible categories of change
orders, classified based on typical reasons.
The Policy requirements, described in detail in
INDOT’s ‘‘Policy for Construction Change Orders on
Highway Construction Contracts’’ (refer Appendix),
include the following with respect to recording of
change orders:

N

N
N

‘‘1.1. A Change Order is not required, within the limits set
out below, to authorize minor changes in original
contract pay item quantities that are typically necessary
to meet the scope and design of the contract. Once any
one of the limits below is exceeded a Change Order shall
be generated to authorize the revision. The Change Order
shall include all revisions to original contract pay item
quantities not previously addressed by a Change Order.
Additional Change Orders due to further changes in
original contract pay item quantities are not required
until the limits of this section are again exceeded.
1.1.1 $20,000 sum total change in any one original
contract pay item.
1.1.2 The greater of $20,000 sum total change in all
contract pay item quantities or a sum total change of 2%
of the original contract amount in all original contract
pay item quantities, not to exceed $250,000.’’

Hence, change orders are recorded on INDOT
projects under the above conditions. In order to enable
INDOT to manage changes better in future, all change
orders are assigned a reason code that indicates the
reason for the occurrence of the change order. All items
on a particular change order are assigned the same
reason code. The following is a summary of the reason
codes used at INDOT:
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

Contract Documents Errors and Omissions (codes 101 to
111): An error or omission in the contract documents
which prevents the contract to be constructed as
intended.
Scope Changes (codes 301 to 309): A change in the
project limits or design that revises the original intent of
the contract.
Changed field Conditions (codes 401 to 407): Either an
existing or new condition that could not have been
reasonably foreseen either by INDOT or the contractor
prior to beginning the work.
Failed Material (code 500): Material failures that result
in penalties, reduced payment of items of work.
Standard Changes (codes 701 to 703): A change in the
contract specifications as a result of an INDOT
department decision to initiate changes to active
contracts on a statewide basis.

A comprehensive list of all the reason codes is shown
below in Table 4.1.
Using the above information, we will next see how
the pertinent data from the 300 contracts were selected
and sorted.
4.3.3. Data relevant to geotechnical work
As far as identifying the data related to geotechnical
work, all the soil-related works that included soilrelated items such as aggregate, backfill, backfill
borrow, debris removal, erosion, excavation, geogrids,
geotextiles, linear grading, riprap, stone, sub-base,
sub-grade, tie bars and top soil were identified, and
the associated bid amounts and change order amounts
were stored as part of the dataset. The lack of precise
descriptions and reason codes that would allow proper
identification of root causes necessitated such a wide
classification of soil-related work. However, all the
change orders associated with soil-related items were
not necessarily due to geotechnical reasons. For
example, in case of costs associated with excavation
and aggregates, the reasons could either be geotechnical in the case where soil treatment (undercutting and
replacement) was not mentioned in the plans.
However it could also be due to other reasons where
there was a scope change in the project and hence
more aggregate and excavation was required or the
recycled pavement which was supposed to be used for
filling was not sufficient. Hence, the change orders
associated with soil-related items needed to be further
classified to ensure that we narrow down to the
change orders that are precisely caused by geotechnical reasons.
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1.

TABLE 4.1
Reason codes at INDOT
Reason
code
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
500
601
602
603
604
605
701
702
703

2.
3.
Reason for Change Order
Error & Omissions: Contract Documents, Contract
Related
Error & Omissions: Contract Documents, Design Related
Error & Omissions: Contract Documents, Environmental
Related
Error & Omissions: Contract Documents, Materials
Related
Error & Omissions: Contract Documents, Permits
Error & Omissions: Contract Documents, Quantity
Related
Error & Omissions: Contract Documents, R/W Related
Error & Omissions: Contract Documents, Soils Related
Error & Omissions: Contract Documents, Staging Related
Error & Omissions: Contract Documents, Traffic Control
Related
Error & Omissions: Contract Documents, Utilities Related
Constructability: Construction Related
Constructability: Design Related
Constructability: Environmental Related
Constructability: Materials Related
Constructability: R/W Related
Constructability: Soils Related
Constructability: Staging Related
Constructability: Traffic Control Related
Constructability: Utilities Related
Scope Changes: FHWA
Scope Changes: Central Office Construction/ Traffic
Scope Changes: District/ Sub-district
Scope Changes: District Construction Engineer
Scope Changes: Area Engineer
Scope Changes: Project Engineer/ Supervisor
Scope Changes: Traffic Engineer
Scope Changes: Local Agency request
Scope Changes: Public/ Political Request
Changed Field Conditions: Construction Related
Changed Field Conditions: Environmental Related
Changed Field Conditions: Materials Related
Changed Field Conditions: R/W Related
Changed Field Conditions: Soils Related
Changed Field Conditions: Staging Related
Changed Field Conditions: Utilities Related
Failed Material
Incentive/ Disincentive: Contract Completion Time
Incentive/ Disincentive: Contract Payments
Incentive/ Disincentive: Cost Reduction
Incentive/ Disincentive: A+B Contract
Incentive/ Disincentive: A+B+C Contract
Standards/ Specs: Update or Changes, Contract
Completion Time
Standards/ Specs: Update or Changes, Contract Payments
Standards/ Specs: Update or Changes, Other

4.3.4. Sorting of data related to geotechnical work
In order to identify the change orders with geotechnical reasons, the change orders with reason codes the
following reason codes were classified separately, as
geotechnical change orders. These reason codes were:
16

108 - Errors and Omission Contract document: Soils
Related
206 - Constructability: Soils Related
405 - Changed Field Conditions: Soils Related

After filtering the data based on the reason codes, all
the change orders that were that had the above three
reason codes, i.e., the geotechnical change orders, were
planned to be further broken down in the following
manner:
1.

2.

Geotechnical change orders that occurred in contracts
where the geotechnical work was directly under the
supervision of the state (managed by the Geotechnical
Division at INDOT) – were to be referred to as STATE
contracts.
Geotechnical change orders that occurred in contracts
where the geotechnical work was performed by local
consultants – were to be referred to as LOCAL contracts.

However due to the lack of specific information at
INDOT that indicated whether the state handled the
geotechnical work on a particular project or not, all the
contracts could not be classified into STATE and
LOCAL contracts. Hence this classification was not
included in the database or the data analysis.
4.4. Descriptive Statistics
This study seeks to identify the frequency of
geotechnical change orders and the main reasons
responsible for these changes. Accordingly, it was
anticipated that a descriptive statistical analysis on the
data would shed some light on the variation of
construction costs and change order costs across
districts and project types, frequency of geotechnical
change orders, the costs involved, the reasons for their
occurrence and the frequency of these reasons. Simple
graphs that show variation of these quantities show the
general trend they follow. Bar graphs and pie charts
help in providing a visual indication of the costs
involved and the frequency of geotechnical change
orders and their reasons. Also, the relative standing
between districts, contract types and reason codes could
be assessed through such graphs. Hence, the use of such
descriptive tools to analyze the data will provide a
platform for making inferences about geotechnical
change orders trends. The descriptive statistics that
were prepared for the dataset are presented in
Chapter 5.
4.5. Interviews
Apart from analyzing the data from the contracts,
the opinion of people who were involved with these
change orders and work day to day on INDOT
contracts, would be invaluable towards understanding
the geotechnical change order situation on INDOT
projects. In order to further scrutinize the topic and
understand exactly how and why geotechnical change
orders occur, and how they are managed, interviews
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43,442
48,534
53,849
45,783
61,181
6,479
7,619
10,664
8,012
9,535
14.92%
15.70%
19.80%
17.50%
15.58%
37,429
26,282
36,720
44,002
178,915
4,614
5,032
8,612
10,511
33,754
12.33%
19.15%
23.45%
23.89%
18.87%
65,142
79,209
54,909
14,411
36,635
13,590
18,611
11,303
2,006
3,437
20.86%
23.50%
20.59%
13.92%
9.38%
40,694
37,064
71,451
17,752
47,332
5,656
4,461
6,681
1,760
5,409
13.90%
12.04%
9.35%
9.92%
11.43%
80,212
104,863
91,871
93,815
62,126
10,941
13,631
28,030
16,575
8,478
13.64%
13.00%
30.51%
17.67%
13.65%
28,596
27,671
38,699
73,828
17,039
3,488
2,472
5,875
10,536
2,688
12.20%
8.93%
15.18%
14.27%
15.77%
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Soil-related Items as Percentage of
Construction Cost

Cost of Soil-related Items

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

8,583
16,112
29,448
30,892
25,039
588
1,508
3,484
6,681
3,443
6.85%
9.36%
11.83%
21.63%
13.75%

Average
Vince-nnes
Sey-mour
LaPorte
Green-field
Fort Wayne

Final Construction Cost (Top ten
contracts)

In the previous chapter, we looked at the study
methodology in detail. With the available data, the
geotechnical change order information across the six
chosen IN districts is presented in this Chapter in the
form of scatter plots, bar graphs and pie charts. These
graphs will enable us to visualize the trends followed by
change orders in the districts of Indiana. With the
inferences from these graphs and the results of the
interviews described in the next Chapter, we will be able
to reach useful conclusions and to propose recommendations for preventing or managing geotechnical
change orders better. As mentioned in the previous
chapter, the data was collected from the top ten
contracts(in terms of total construction cost) of six
districts in Indiana(all contracts ended in the five years
between 2003 and 2007). The various classifications
that are part of the graphs are based on (i) the different
districts – Crawfordsville, Fort Wayne, Greenfield,
LaPorte, Seymour and Vincennes; (ii) types of projects
– road, bridge, resurfacing and maintenance (due to the

Crawford-sville

5.1. Introduction

Year

CHAPTER 5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Category

This chapter discussed the method of study adopted
in order to investigate the problem of geotechnical
change orders. The process of collection of material and
it’s basis were described. The selection of relevant data
from all the material that was collected was discussed
and the rationale behind it was explained. The sorting
of the dataset, in order to be able to perform suitable
analysis, was elaborated upon as well, in this chapter.
Also the proposed analysis of the data, using descriptive statistics, was also briefly discussed. Further, the
need for talking to personnel involved with geotechnical
change orders at INDOT was discussed and a accordingly, a mention was made regarding interviews that
were conducted with INDOT project engineers and
geotechnical consultants who work on INDOT projects. The next chapter presents in detail all the
descriptive statistical analysis conducted on the data,
which will help us in obtaining useful inferences
regarding geotechnical change orders at INDOT.

District (amounts in thousands of dollars)

4.6. Summary

TABLE 5.1
Variation of estimated total annual construction cost and estimated total annual cost for soil-related items in all districts: 2003–2007

were conducted with personnel linked closely with
geotechnical change orders on INDOT contracts.
Project Engineers who worked on some of the contracts
that are part of this study and geotechnical consultants
who work on INDOT projects on a regular basis were
contacted and interviewed. The interviewees were
requested to provide information regarding the geotechnical change orders on the contracts they worked
on and also other geotechnical change orders they have
come across in their experience. The information
gathered and the results from these interviews are
presented in detail in Chapter 6.
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Figure 5.1 Variation of total construction cost, cost of soil-related items, soil-related items as a percentage of construction cost
between 2003 and 2007– Crawfordsville

Figure 5.2 Variation of total construction cost, cost of soil-related items, soil-related as a percentage of construction cost
between 2003 and 2007– Fort Wayne
18
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Figure 5.3 Variation of total construction cost, cost of soil-related items, soil-related items as a percentage of construction cost
between 2003 and 2007 – Greenfield

Figure 5.4 Variation of total construction cost, cost of soil-related items, soil-related items as a percentage of construction cost
between 2003 and 2007 – LaPorte
Joint Transportation Research Program Technical Report FHWA/IN/JTRP-2011/08
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Figure 5.5 Variation of total construction cost, cost of soil-related items, soil-related items as a percentage of construction cost
between 2003 and 2007 – Seymour

Figure 5.6 Variation of total construction cost, cost of soil-related items, soil-related items as a percentage of construction cost
between 2003 and 2007 – Vincennes
20
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Figure 5.7 Variation of net overrun on soil-related items as a percentage of the total construction cost across six districts
between 2003–2007

typical low costs of maintenance projects, there were
only a few maintenance projects in the 300 contracts
covered in the data set) and (iii) various reason codes
assigned to change orders.
In the following sections, we will look at all the useful
descriptive statistics describing the relevant data from
the chosen contracts. The terms that are used throughout this Chapter are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

7.

8.

CO: Change Order
Total construction cost or total contract cost: total
amount spent, calculated after construction.
Cost overrun: amount spent in excess of the estimated
cost.
Cost underrun: difference of the estimated cost and the
amount spent, when the expenditure is less than the
estimated cost (expressed as negative).
Total change order (CO): the sum of magnitudes of the
overrun and underrun in terms of costs.
Net overrun: difference of Overruns and Underruns 5
the net amount spent over the estimated costs (negative if
there is a net underrun).
Soil-related items: any soil-related item, such as aggregate, backfill, backfill borrow, debris removal, erosion,
excavation, geogrids, geotextiles, linear grading, riprap,
stone, sub-base, subgrade, tie bars and top soil that are
recorded in the change order documents (these can be
change orders in any type of work – geotechnical or other
- with any of the reason codes listed in INDOT’s ‘‘Policy
for Construction Contract Change Orders’’).
Change orders associated with soil-related items: all
change orders recorded, involving soil-related items, as
described in point 7.

9.

Geotechnical reason codes: these are geotechnical reason
Codes 108 – Errors and Omissions: Soils Related; 206 –
Constructability Issues: Soils Related; and 405 – Changed
Field Conditions: Soils Related; as described in INDOT’s
‘‘Policy for Construction Contract Change Orders.’’).
10. Geotechnical change orders (geo CO): change orders that
have geotechnical reason codes.

As it will be explained in detail later, the data in
Section 5.3 contains the change orders associated with
soil-related items (which may not be related to geotechnical work). These change orders may not be due to
geotechnical reasons. For example, due to a scope change
on a particular contract, some additional pavement may
have to be constructed. This may require subgrade
treatment at the concerned location, where no treatment
had been planned for originally. Though the change
orders associated with this additional work will involve
soil-related items such as aggregate, the change orders
would not have occurred due to geotechnical reasons. On
the other hand, Section 5.4 contains the geotechnical
change order information – change orders with geotechnical reason codes (reason codes 108, 206, 405). Again,
note that all the data presented in this Chapter is only
for the top ten contracts (in terms of total construction
cost)of six districts in IN for the period of 2003–2007.

5.2. Contract Costs
From the literature review performed for this study,
we know that the contract cost is an influential factor in
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2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Total Change Order Cost

% of CO in Soil-related Items out of Total Change Orders

Overrun

Underrun

Net Overrun of Soil-related Items

Year

Category
1,301
1,375
3,485
2,590
3,338
74
336
117
693
280
272
219
2126
2109
2648
146
355
244
802
2928
16.82%
27.19%
15.92%
35.17%
56.05%

Crawford-sville
4,233
2,653
2,478
5,790
1,521
869
374
381
1,933
92
2182
2114
2115
2183
2226
1,051
489
496
2,116
317
29.12%
22.72%
24.64%
39.72%
35.69%

Fort Wayne
8,744
9,293
25,110
9,132
7,764
926
2,195
11,939
2,382
1,228
2166
2409
28
252
0
1,092
2,604
11,947
2,434
1,228
14.39%
32.42%
47.61%
27.22%
15.82%

Green-field
4,993
3,288
7,522
1,224
8,597
813
737
521
(346)
2,066
2280
2253
2170
2466
2249
1,094
990
690
120
2,315
27.52%
37.81%
11.43%
47.87%
29.83%

LaPorte
Seymour
3,377
6,855
5,979
1,620
129
2,090
1,833
11
173
677
2581
2229
2350
2161
2252
710
2,319
2,183
172
38.25%
37.17%
42.36%
20.54%
28.91%

Sey-mour

District (amounts in thousands of dollars)

TABLE 5.2
Variation of total CO and CO in soil-related items

8,166
6,325
8,574
6,532
13,293
1,162
616
3,414
1,844
4,732
265
2254
284
2599
234
1,097
361
3,330
1,245
4,698
14.23%
9.73%
39.82%
28.23%
35.60%

Vincen-nes

5,135
4,965
8,858
4,481
6,142
640
973
3,006
887
1,417
2225
2213
2142
2262
2235
865
1,186
3,148
1,148
1,342
21.22%
28.18%
37.49%
31.46%
31.52%

Average

Figure 5.8

Figure 5.9

Total change orders, cost overruns and underruns for 2003–2007: Crawfordsville.

Total change orders, cost overruns and underruns for 2003–2007: Fort Wayne
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Figure 5.10

Figure 5.11
24

Total change orders, cost overruns and underruns for 2003–2007: Greenfield

Total change orders, cost overruns and underruns for 2003–2007: LaPorte
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Figure 5.12

Total change orders, cost overruns and underruns for 2003–2007: Seymour

Figure 5.13

Total change orders, cost overruns and underruns for 2003–2007: Vincennes
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Figure 5.14

Average variation of total change orders and change orders in soil-related items in all six districts of Indiana

TABLE 5.3
Distribution of contracts across percentage ranges of change orders associated with soil-related items with respect to the total change
order amounts
Percentage of CO in
Soil-related Items
0–20%
20–40%
40–60%
60–80%
80–100%

Number of Contracts – District wise
Crawfordsville

Fort Wayne

Greenfield

LaPorte

Seymour

Vincennes

Average

23
11
6
7
3

22
17
6
3
2

23
14
3
6
4

24
9
12
3
2

27
7
7
5
4

37
5
3
3
2

26.00
10.50
6.17
4.50
2.83

TABLE 5.4
Distribution of contracts in ranges of overruns and underruns of soil-related items as a percent of total CO
% Overrun/Underrun
of Soil-related Items
under 275%
275 to 250%
250 to 225%
225 to 0%
0 to 25%
25 to 50%
50 to 75%
over 75%
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Number of Contracts – District-Wise
Crawford-sville

Fort Wayne

Greenfield

LaPorte

Seymour

Vincennes

Average

2
2
7
7
17
5
3
7

2
4
6
7
12
7
5
6

0
2
4
7
13
6
1
12

5
3
7
8
6
7
5
8

1
1
3
13
12
4
1
10

0
2
1
10
17
6
3
11

1.7
2.3
4.7
8.7
12.8
5.8
3.0
9.0
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Figure 5.15 Distribution of contracts against amount of change orders in soil-related items expressed as a percentage of total
change order amounts

Figure 5.16 Distribution of contracts in ranges of overrun/underrun in soil-related items as a percent of total CO across six
districts: 2003 to 2007
Joint Transportation Research Program Technical Report FHWA/IN/JTRP-2011/08
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TABLE 5.5
Average amounts of overrun/underrun associated with ranges of
overrun/underrun of soil-related items as a percent of total CO
Percentage of Overrun/Underrun
in Soil-related Items
under 275%
275 to 250%
250 to 225%
225 to 0%
0 to 25%
25 to 50%
50 to 75%
over 75%

Average Amounts in Dollars
2$78,833.59
2$43,283.70
2$67,971.93
2$143,182.99
$349,759.79
$617,149.59
$205,388.99
$779,246.06

the eventual amount of change orders. According to
some of the studies presented in the literature review in
Chapter 2, the greater the total construction cost, the
greater the number of change orders is. Hence, the
decision to look at the distribution of annual contract
costs amidst the six districts between the years 2003 and
2007. Also, since we are trying to examine the
circumstances and causes of geotechnical change orders
at INDOT, the amounts spent annually on soil-related
items on all the contracts are also important information. It is reasonable to assume that if the total cost for
soil-related items is higher, then the number of
geotechnical change orders is also higher. Table 5.1
shows the variation of annual construction costs and
annual cost of soil-related items for the top ten
contracts in each of the six districts during the period
2003 to 2007. Figures 5.1 to 5.6 represent this variation

through bar graphs for each of the six districts. Along
with the annual construction costs and the annual cost
for soil-related items, the cost of soil-related items is
also shown as a percentage of the total construction
cost in order to portray the relative standing between
the two quantities. From these figures, it is seen that the
cost of soil-related items understandably increases with
increases in total contract cost in many cases. Over the
five-year period, Greenfield had the maximum construction costs on all years, except in 2007 when
Vincennes topped with a total construction cost of
$178,915,172.43 from the top ten contracts. This also
happens to be the maximum cost spent in a single year
from the top ten contracts from any of the districts in
any year; the corresponding cost for soil-related items is
$33,753,753.50, which is 18.87% of the total construction cost. The next highest annual contract amount is
$104,862,893.04 spent in Greenfield in the top ten
contracts from 2006. The corresponding amount spent
on soil-related items for this year is $13,631,394.58,
making up for 13.00% of the total construction cost in
the top ten contracts of that year.
5.3. Change orders associated with soil-related items
In this section, we look at the change order data from
the top ten contracts in all six districts between the
years 2003 and 2007. Figure 5.7 shows the net overrun
of soil-related items as a percentage of the total
constructions costs. The net overrun is calculated by
subtracting the overruns from the underruns. The net
overruns are not alarmingly high for any of the

Figure 5.17 Average overrun/underrun amounts associated with ranges of change orders in soil-related items as a percent of
total change orders
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TABLE 5.6
Number of contracts vs. Changes in soil-related items per contract
Number of Changes in Soil-related Items/
Contract

Number of
Contracts

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
35
36
42
47

25
21
19
20
19
21
21
18
11
13
12
7
9
18
12
5
8
4
6
4
4
3
2
5
2
2
2
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1

districts, except for a relatively high 13% net overrun in
Greenfield in the year 2005 which is accompanied by
negligible underruns. In all the districts, greater cost
overrun than cost underrun in soil-related items is seen
in most years, the exceptions being LaPorte in 2006 and
Crawfordsville in 2007, as indicated by their negative
percentages of net overrun. However, these can be seen
as acceptable considering that the costs for any type of

construction work rarely runs under or parallel to the
expected costs.
Table 5.2 and Figures 5.8 to 5.14 show the variation
of the amount of change orders in soil-related items
along with the total change order amounts in each
district between the years of 2003 and 2007. The change
orders associated with soil-related items are split into
cost overruns and cost underruns. Considering that we
are looking at the change orders associated with all the
soil-related items, it is not surprising that these count
on for 21.77% of the total change orders for all the 300
contracts. Later in this Chapter, we will look at only the
geotechnical change orders (with geotechnical reason
codes108, 206, 405), which should give a better and
more detailed assessment of the change orders related
to geotechnical work.
Fig.5.14 shows the variation of average total change
orders and average change orders (net overrun) in
soil-related items for all the six districts of Indiana
between the years 2003 and 2007.
Table 5.3 and Fig. 5.15 describe the distribution of
the number of contracts across specific ranges of
percentages of amount of change orders (overrun +
underrun) associated with soil-related items in each
district in each year. The change order amounts are
calculated by adding the magnitudes of overrun and
underrun costs on each contract; these are further
expressed as a percentage of the total change order
amounts in each contract. One has to note that these
percentages are different from the percentages of net
overruns in soil-related items that were shown in
Fig. 5.2, where the net overruns were the sum of the
overruns and the underruns that were finally expressed
as a percentage of the total construction cost.
We also looked at the ranges of overruns and
underruns in soil-related items that have occurred in
the 300 contracts in each of the six districts between
2003 and 2007. Table 5.4 displays this data. Figure 5.16
presents this distribution in terms of bar graphs. It can
be seen that the maximum number of contracts lie in
the 0 to 25% range of cost overruns in soil-related
items, the amounts being calculated as a percentage of
the total change order amounts. This trend is observed
in almost all the districts.
Table 5.5 gives the average amounts associated with
each percentage range of overruns or underruns in soil-

TABLE 5.7
Number of changes in soil-related items across districts in 2003–2007
Number of Contracts – District wise
Years

Crawford-sville

Fort Wayne

Greenfield

LaPorte

Seymour

Vincennes

Total

Average

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

26
61
86
85
80

96
67
96
121
86

122
128
100
97
72

110
94
94
68
90

144
84
118
94
68

122
116
107
112
170

620
550
601
577
566

103.33
91.67
100.17
96.17
94.33
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Figure 5.18

Figure 5.19
30

Number of contracts vs. Number of changes in soil-related items per contract

Variation of number of changes in soil-related items between 2003 and 2007
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TABLE 5.8
Data from Road Contracts in Indiana
District (amounts are in thousands of dollars)
Category

Year

Crawford-Sville

Fort Wayne

Green-field

LaPorte

Seymour

Vince-Nnes

Average

Total Construc-tion Cost

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

838
4270
22669
25138
17093
18
285
3090
6165
2600
272
415
2698
1851
2580
10
118
396
1017
561
3.84%
28.41%
14.67%
54.94%
21.73%
1
3
5
6
5

21368
14814
28539
59775
7703
2843
1842
5583
9950
2282
2190
1276
1405
4792
884
1023
305
387
2134
320
46.74%
23.88%
27.52%
44.52%
36.17%
5
4
4
5
5

74040
94912
90398
86721
60289
10504
12995
28022
16310
8413
7925
7972
24786
7950
7315
1102
2989
11950
2348
1190
13.91%
37.49%
48.21%
29.53%
16.27%
8
7
9
7
8

19049
23793
38290
3323
25849
3578
3489
5714
321
4187
2625
2160
2944
321
6649
389
853
484
163
2081
14.80%
39.51%
16.44%
50.72%
31.29%
3
5
4
3
3

63895
74269
49451
5582
28392
13403
18309
11124
1264
2694
3165
6276
5399
848
1642
1153
2336
2515
148
537
36.42%
37.22%
46.59%
17.46%
32.69%
9
6
7
4
3

5748
19258
26712
32481
175881
1335
4665
7314
9444
33651
1136
4700
6873
4636
12594
495
440
3115
1353
4710
43.61%
9.37%
45.33%
29.18%
37.40%
3
6
4
4
9

30823
38553
42676
35503
52535
5280
6931
10141
7242
8971
2885
3800
7351
3400
5277
695
1173
3141
1194
1566
24.10%
30.88%
42.73%
35.11%
29.68%
5
5
6
5
6

Total Cost of Soil-related
Items

Total CO

CO in Soil-related Items

% CO in Soil-related Items
out Of Total CO

Number of contracts

related items, calculated as a percentage of the total
change order amounts. Figure 5.17 presents this data.
We now examine the variation of the number of
changes in soil-related items that occurred in the 300
contracts. The contracts are counted separately based
on the number of changes in soil-related items in each
of these contracts. One or more changes to soil-related
items may belong to the same change order. For
example, a single change order may have had changes
in aggregate, riprap and geogrids, and these changes are
counted as three changes in soil-related items even
though they belong to the same change order. These
data are presented in Table 5.6 and in Figure. 5.18. It
can be seen that the maximum number of contracts (25)
have just one change in soil-related items. Also, there
are 21 contracts, each with two, six and seven changes
in soil-related items per contract. Most of the occurrences are populated in the less than seven changes in
soil-related items per contract range.
Table 5.7 shows the variation of the number of
changes in soil-related items across the six districts
between the years 2003 and 2007. The maximum
number of changes associated with soil-related items
was 170 in Vincennes in the year 2007. On average,

there were about 583 changes per year in all the six
districts put together. Figure 5.19 shows the variation
of number of changes per year in all the six districts put
together. The year of 2003 had a maximum of 620
changes associated with soil-related items.
5.3.1. Contract Types
Out of the 300 contracts on the data set, there were
155 road contracts, 96 resurfacing contracts, 44 bridge
contracts and 5 maintenance contracts. From the
geotechnical office at INDOT, we learnt that they
rarely have anything to do with change orders on
resurfacing projects. This is also reflected by the data in
the fact that even though the resurfacing contracts have
change orders in soil-related items, they rarely have
change orders with geotechnical reason codes. The data
for the geotechnical change orders will be presented in
sections later on this Chapter. In this section, we will
continue to examine the data from change orders
associated with soil-related items, looking at their
variation with the four contract types – Road (R)
Resurfacing (RS), Bridge (B) and Maintenance (M).
Since only the top ten contracts of every year were
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TABLE 5.9
Data from Resurfacing contracts in Indiana.
District (amounts are in thousands of dollars)
Category

Year

Crawford-sville

Fort Wayne

Green-Field

LaPorte

Seymour

Vincennes

Average

Total Constru-ction Cost

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

7337
8267
5242
2300
6153
296
545
192
13
416
829
573
372
117
502
98
112
64
12
284
11.86%
19.53%
17.23%
10.39%
56.60%
7
4
3
1
3

4402
12857
10160
14053
9336
272
630
292
587
406
853
1376
1074
997
638
162
298
224
166
223
18.94%
21.64%
20.86%
16.65%
35.03%
3
6
6
5
5

0
3015
1472
7093
1446
0
34
8
265
65
0
571
325
1182
190
0
18
5
138
37
3.15%
1.55%
11.66%
19.35%
0
1
1
3
1

5844
7001
14072
10419
10036
188
371
607
986
438
679
626
3486
253
1271
160
221
195
202
187
23.58%
35.30%
5.60%
79.63%
14.75%
3
3
3
3
4

0
4425
5458
4899
3092
0
220
179
186
56
0
430
580
434
380
0
146
17
40
49
33.89%
2.97%
9.17%
12.81%
3
3
4
5

3918
4005
8555
10977
3034
404
175
983
1060
102
570
1394
1533
1594
699
203
115
249
491
22
35.57%
8.24%
16.27%
30.81%
3.09%
2
3
5
5
1

3583
6595
7493
8290
5516
193
329
377
516
247
489
828
1228
763
613
104
152
126
175
134
21.24%
18.29%
10.25%
22.91%
21.79%
3
3
4
4
3

Total Cost of Soil-related
Items

Total CO

CO in Soil-related Items

% CO in Soil-related Items
out Of Total CO

Number of contracts

chosen from every district, the data set included a very
low number of maintenance contracts, considering
that maintenance contracts typically don’t have large
budgets.
Table 5.8 shows the construction cost and change
order data for all the 155 road projects from the six
districts. Table 5.9 shows the construction cost and
change order data for all the 96 resurfacing contracts.
Table 5.10 shows the construction cost and change
order data for the 44 bridge contracts that were part of
the data set. Table 5.11 shows the construction cost and
the change order data from the five maintenance
contracts in the data set. From this data, it is clear
which types of contracts undergo maximum change
orders in general, particularly for change orders
associated with soil-related items.
Figure 5.20 clearly shows that road projects dominate in number over the five years. Fig.5.21 shows the
contribution of each contract type to the average
construction cost over the five year period between
2003 and 2007 from all the six districts. Again, it is seen
that the maximum construction costs are concentrated
in road contracts. This is expected as well considering
the length of road projects. This reinforces what was
32

already evident from the fact that the top 300 contracts
in terms of construction costs contained 155 road
contracts. Fig. 5.22 shows the variation of the amount
of change orders associated with soil-related items for
every contract type between the years of 2003 and 2007.
As one would anticipate, road projects have the
maximum amount of change orders in the category of
soil-related items. The year of 2005, saw a large number
of change orders associated with soil-related items as
the six districts had many expensive road contracts
completed in that year.
5.3.2. COs in Soil-related Items Classified Based on
Reason Codes
In Chapter 4, we looked at all the reason codes for
change orders. Based on these reason codes, the data
was classified such that the reason codes that occurred
frequently could be identified. This was done to help in
determining problematic issues that cause changes in
soil-related items. In this section, we look at the changes
that took place for various soil-related items. Changes
to various soil-related items may have taken place as
part of the same change order, however here they were
classified as separate changes on individual items.
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TABLE 5.10
Data from Bridge Contracts in Indiana
District (amounts are in thousands of dollars)
Category

Year

Crawford-sville

Fort
Wayne

Green-field

LaPorte

Seymour

Vincennes

Average

Total Constru-ction Cost

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

276
3575
1538
2824
1793
143
679
201
502
427
105
387
414
311
256
15
188
126
150
108
14.78%
48.52%
30.37%
48.21%
42.22%
1
3
2
2
2

2826
0
0
0
0
372
0
0
0
0
1190
0
0
0
0
47
0
0
0
0
3.97%
2
0
0
0
0

6171
6936
0
0
0
437
602
0
0
0
818
750
0
0
0
156
6
0
0
0
19.05%
0.78%
2
2
0
0
0

15318
6271
6646
4010
11447
1863
601
335
453
784
1387
502
559
650
676
705
169
158
222
296
50.84%
33.62%
28.35%
34.09%
43.80%
4
2
2
4
3

1247
0
0
3930
1993
186
0
0
556
682
212
0
0
339
139
139
0
0
145
85
65.50%
42.80%
61.25%
1
0
0
2
2

27763
3019
1453
544
0
2875
192
314
7
0
6460
231
168
303
0
464
61
49
0
0
7.18%
26.15%
29.12%
0.02%
5
1
1
1
0

8934
3300
1606
1885
2539
979
346
142
253
315
1695
312
190
267
179
254
71
56
86
82
15.01%
22.62%
29.20%
32.23%
45.69%
3
1
1
2
1

Total Cost of Soil-related
Items

Total CO

CO in Soil-related Items

% CO in Soil-related Items
out Of Total CO

Number of Contracts

Recall the example already mentioned - a single change
order may have had changes in aggregate, riprap and
geogrids (these changes were counted as three changes)
in soil-related items even though these changes
belonged to the same change order. Table 5.12 shows
the frequency of occurrence for each of the major
classification of reason codes associated with changes in
soil-related items in each of the six districts. Greenfield
has the maximum number of changes with respect to
soil-related items. The major classification includes all
the reason codes that fall in hundreds. For example, all
the reason codes that fall in the 100’s (101, 102… and so

on) belong to ‘‘Errors and Omissions’’ and classify into
one major division. The reason codes and their
explanation were listed in Chapter 4. Figure 5.23 shows
the major classifications and their frequencies in all six
districts together. These are reason code occurrences for
changes in soil-related items. We can see that constructability issues were responsible for 831 changes in
soil-related items. This was the maximum, ahead of the
637 changes due to ‘‘Errors and Omissions’’.
In order to further narrow down on the frequent
reason codes, the major classification of reason codes
was broken down to individual reason codes for every

TABLE 5.11
Data from Maintenance Contracts from Indiana
Year

Total const. cost

Total soil-related item

Total CO

CO in soil-related item

% of Geo CO

No. of contracts

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

$22,000.00
$0.00
$0.00
$105,009.94
$65,178.06

$21,716.67
$0.00
$0.00
$198.33
$220.00

$15,750.00
$0.00
$0.00
$51,809.94
$43,246.07

$15,750.00
$0.00
$0.00
$128.33
$170.00

100.00%
0.25%
0.39%

1
0
0
1
1
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Figure 5.20

Distribution of the number of contracts with project types in the six districts of Indiana between 2003 and 2007

Figure 5.21

Distribution of average construction costs of each contract type
TABLE 5.12
Number of changes in soil-related items vs. Reason codes
Number of Contracts – District wise

Major Classification of Reason Code
Errors and Omissions -100’s
Constructability- 200’s
Scope Changes- 300’s
Changed Field Conditions - 400’s
Incentive / Disincentive – 600’s
Standard / Spec. Change – 700’s
Total

34

Crawford-Sville

Fort Wayne

Greenfield

LaPorte

Seymour

Vincennes

44
85
22
20
0
0
171

47
133
39
32
0
2
253

279
176
53
58
0
2
568

88
122
32
50
0
0
292

77
155
52
79
4
1
368

102
160
73
50
0
2
387
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Figure 5.22

Variation of average annual construction costs from all districts among different contract types – 2003 to 2007

Figure 5.23

Number of changes in soil-related items vs. Reasons for changes
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TABLE 5.13
Frequency of reason codes for changes in soil-related items
Number of Contracts – District wise
Prominent Reason Codes
101
102
106
201
202
203
204
206
209
302
303
305
306
308
309
401
405

Crawford-sville

Fort Wayne

Greenfield

LaPorte

Seymour

Vincennes

Total

4
26
9
40
6
1
2
34
1
2
2
17
9
7

1
31
13
56
17
6
9
39
2
1
20
1
2
14
17
10

19
122
134
99
13
11
13
32
4
12
6
5
10
12
2
29
17

4
40
41
49
17
2
10
30
2
3
4
5
16
2
34
13

5
45
22
51
26
2
9
37
23
21
5
6
12
49
28

10
51
23
57
20
12
3
60
1
11
3
9
16
5
28
28
13

43
315
242
352
99
34
46
232
30
48
32
26
41
76
32
166
88

one of the changes associated with soil-related items.
The most frequent reason codes – those that occurred
more than 20 times – are shown in Table 5.13.
Fig. 5.24 shows this variation using bar graphs. It
can be seen that reason codes 201 – Construction
Related Constructability Issues and 102 - Design
Related Errors and Omissions - were the most
frequent of the reason codes with 352 and 315
occurrences, respectively. Reason codes 106 –
Quantities Related Errors and Omissions and 206 –
Soils Related Constructability Issues also had more
than 200 occurrences each. It is also of importance
that reason code 108 – Soils Related Errors and
Omissions had less than 20 occurrences (13 to be
exact) and hence does not figure in the table or graph
containing frequently occurring reason codes.
5.4. Geotechnical Change Orders
In the previous section, we looked at the change
orders associated with soil-related items. In this section,
we look at the geotechnical change orders – change
orders that had geotechnical reason codes (108, 206,
405), and that can be assumed to have occurred due to
geotechnical reasons. The geotechnical reason codes
that were assigned to these change orders were – 108:
Errors and Omissions - Soils Related; 206:
Constructability – Soils Related; 405 – Changed Field
Conditions – Soil Related. The data was broken down
to identify these change orders separately, and the
corresponding descriptive statistics were prepared.
Firstly, we look at the geotechnical change order
amounts for each of the six districts in each of the five
years between 2003 and 2007. Table 5.14 shows the net
overrun in geotechnical change order amounts and
their percentages in terms of the total construction cost.
36

It can be seen that, except in LaPorte in 2004, which
had an underrun, generally geotechnical change order
amounts are overruns. The highest was in 2005 when
Greenfield had a net overrun of over eight million due
to geotechnical change orders. Otherwise, the percentages seem to be pretty low as far as geotechnical
change orders are concerned. It should also be noted in
Fig. 5.25, Fig. 5.26 and Fig. 5.27 that there are no bar
graphs for the district of Crawfordsville in the year of
2003. This is because the district of Crawfordsville did
not experience any geotechnical change orders in 2003.
The net overrun amounts due to geotechnical change
orders are represented in Figure 5.25 in the form of bar
graphs. Figure 5.26 displays the percentage of net
overruns due to geotechnical change orders in terms
of the total construction cost.
In Fig. 5.25, we looked at the net geotechnical
overrun as a percentage of the total construction cost
for each year. It is also useful to look at it from the
individual contracts’ perspective. Table 5.15 and
Figure 5.26 show the distribution of contracts among
various net geotechnical overrun percentage ranges. It
can be seen that almost all of the contracts lie under the
ten percent range. In fact, on average a larger number
of contracts lie in the 0–1 percent range or the less than
zero range, implying a cost underrun due to geotechnical change orders. As mentioned earlier, the district of
Crawfordsville had no geotechnical change orders in
the year 2003.
Table 5.16 shows the variation of number of
contracts with the number of geotechnical change
orders per contract for each of the six districts between
the years of 2003 and 2007. The data shows that 46 of
the 84 contracts that experienced geotechnical change
orders had only one geotechnical change order, and 24
contracts had two geotechnical change orders. Hence,
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Figure 5.24a

Frequent reason codes for changes in soil-related items vs. Number of changes is soil-related Items

Figure 5.24b

Variation of net overrun due to geotechnical change orders in all six districts: 2003–2007
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$121
$102
$2,114
$581
$616
0.28%
0.21%
3.92%
1.27%
1.01%
$126
$27
$1,642
$38
$602
0.34%
0.10%
4.47%
0.09%
0.34%
Geotech. CO as a percentage of Total Construction Cost

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Net Overrun due to Geotech-nical CO

$0
$44
$216
$269
$1,233
0.00%
0.27%
0.73%
0.87%
4.92%

$164
$43
$543
$638
$238
0.58%
0.15%
1.40%
0.86%
1.40%

$43
$188
$8,203
$2,318
$146
0.05%
0.18%
8.93%
2.47%
0.23%

$120
$65
$511
$104
$1,401
0.29%
20.18%
0.72%
0.59%
2.96%

$270
$377
$1,566
$118
$75
0.42%
0.48%
2.85%
0.82%
0.21%

Average
Vince-nnes
Seymour
LaPorte
Green-field
Fort Wayne
Crawford-sville
Year
Category

Amounts in thousands of dollars for each district

TABLE 5.14
Geotechnical change order data from all six districts

38

even in contracts that undergo change orders with soilrelated reason codes, the number of geotechnical
change orders is low. Figure 5.27 shows this variation
in the form of a simple bar graph.
Table 5.17 and Figure 5.28 show the variation of
number of geotechnical change orders for each year
between 2003 and 2007. Table 5.17 also shows the
district-wise data distribution.
5.4.1. Variation of Geo CO Data with Contract Types
Similar to the change orders associated with soilrelated items, here we look at the variation of
geotechnical change orders with respect to project
types. Resurfacing contracts observed literally no
geotechnical change orders, with a meager quantity of
about four percent of the total number of contracts that
experienced geotechnical change orders. Maintenance
contracts, already very few in numbers, had no
geotechnical change orders. Out of the 84 contracts
that experienced geotechnical change orders, 64 were
road contracts, 16 bridge contracts and 4 resurfacing
projects. About 41% of the total road contracts (155)
experienced geotechnical change orders. About 37% of
the total bridge contracts (44) experienced geotechnical
change orders. The other contract types in this study’s
dataset have insignificant number geotechnical change
orders. Table 5.18 and Table 5.19 show the net overrun
data for geotechnical change orders in road and bridge
contracts, respectively.
Figure 5.29 shows the variation of average net
overruns due to geotechnical change orders with
contract types. Expectedly, road contracts have maximum amounts, with the highest being in 2005, which
also had the maximum change orders with respect to
soil-related items, as shown previously in Figure 5.21.
In this section, the reason code data for geotechnical
change orders is presented. The number of occurrences
of the three Soils - related reason codes 108 - Errors and
Omissions; 206 – Constructability Issues; 405 Changed Field Conditions, in each district is shown in
Table 5.20. Figure 5.30 reflects the same data. It can be
noticed that this is different from the occurrences for
these reason code (108, 206 and 405) presented in
Section 5.3.2, where the total number of soil-related
items that underwent changes with these reasons were
333. Here, we are looking at only the number of change
orders that were associated these reason codes, 158 of
them, and not looking at the changes to individual
items. It is observed that geotechnical constructability
issues cause maximum number of geotechnical change
orders. Changed field conditions also cause a considerable number of geotechnical change orders. Errors and
Omissions related to soils is a very rare reason for
change orders in geotechnical work.
5.5. Summary
In this chapter, the data from the top ten contracts in
terms of total construction costs per year for each
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Figure 5.25

Figure 5.26

Net overrun in geo CO vs. years in all six districts of Indiana

Number of contracts vs. percent geo CO out of total construction cost
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Figure 5.27

Number of Contracts vs. Number of change orders/contract

TABLE 5.15
Distribution of contracts in percent ranges of net geotechnical overruns
Percentage of Geotech. CO in terms of
Construction Cost
less than 0%
0–1%
1–2%
2–3%
3–4%
4–10%
10–20%
over20%

Number of Contracts – District wise
Crawford-sville
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1

Fort Wayne Green-field
2
2
3
1
5
0
1
0

4
5
0
1
0
3
0
1

La Porte Seymour
6
1
4
0
0
1
1
0

3
5
2
1
2
3
1
0

Vincen-nes
1
3
3
1
1
2
1
0

Average
3
3
2
1
2
2
1
2

TABLE 5.16
Number of geotechnical CO/contract vs. Number of contracts
Number of Geotechnical CO/contract
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

40

Number of contracts
46
24
6
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
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TABLE 5.17
Distribution of number of geotechnical change orders
Year

Crawford-sville

FortWayne

Green-field

LaPorte

Seymour

Vincen-nes

Total

AVG

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Total

0
1
5
5
4
15

6
1
8
7
3
25

5
4
6
6
4
26

4
3
9
7
3
29

6
3
12
4
4
39

6
3
13
2
15
25

27
15
53
31
33
159

4.50
2.50
8.83
5.17
5.50

Figure 5.28

Number of geotechnical change orders vs. Year: 2003–2007

TABLE 5.18
Geotechnical change order data for road contracts
Amounts in Thousands of Dollars – District Wise
Category

Year

Crawford-sville

Fort Wayne

Green-field

LaPorte

Seymour

Vincen-nes

Average

Net Overrun in Geo CO

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

0
0
119
181
1160
0.00%
0.00%
0.53%
0.72%
6.79%

164
43
543
615
238
0.77%
0.29%
1.90%
1.03%
3.09%

43
238
8203
2318
146
0.06%
0.25%
9.07%
2.67%
0.24%

239
853
484
21
1401
20.21%
3.59%
1.26%
20.02%
5.42%

175
377
1566
20
6
0.27%
0.51%
3.17%
0.36%
0.02%

17
27
1642
38
602
0.29%
0.14%
6.15%
0.12%
0.34%

43
238
8203
2318
146
0.20%
0.66%
4.90%
1.49%
1.13%

Geo CO as a % of Total
Construction Cost
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TABLE 5.19
Geotechnical change order data for bridge contracts
Amounts in Thousands of Dollars – District Wise
Category

Year

Crawford-sville

Fort Wayne

Green-field

LaPorte

Seymour

Vinc-enes

Average

Net Overrun in Geo CO

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2003
2004
2005
2006

0
44
97
88
73
0.00%
1.22%
6.28%
3.11%

0
0
0
0
0
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

0
251
0
0
0
0.00%
20.73%
0.00%
0.00%

0
226
0
15
0
0.00%
20.42%
0.00%
0.38%

95
0
0
98
69
7.65%
0.00%
0.00%
2.50%

109
0
0
0
0
0.39%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

34
25
16
34
24
0.38%
20.17%
1.00%
1.78%

Geo CO as a % of Total
Construction Cost

Figure 5.29

Variation of average net overruns in geotechnical change orders among contract types: 2003–2007

TABLE 5.20
Occurrence of Geotechnical reason codes
Type
Errors &
Omissions - 108
Construct
ability – 206
Changed Field
Conditions 405
Total

42

Reason Code

Crawfor-dsville

Fort Wayne

Green-field

LaPorte

Seymour

Vinc ennes

Sum

108

1

1

0

1

6

2

11

206

11

18

19

17

19

17

101

405

3

6

6

11

14

6

46

Total

15

25

25

29

39

25

158
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Figure 5.30

Number of geotechnical change orders vs. Reason code

district was presented by means of simple descriptive
statistics such as bar graphs, scatter plots and pie
charts. Data for contract costs, change orders in soilrelated items, geotechnical change orders, contract
types and various reason codes was presented. In order
to assess the occurrence of change orders with
geotechnical reasons, the data in section 5.4 was
deemed to be more relevant considering that it contains
only the data for change orders with soils-related
reason codes 108, 206 and 405. Section 5.3 presented
the change order information for all soil-related items,
which may be of use from a construction quantities
perspective.
The average geotechnical change order amount per
district per year was 1.34 percent of the total estimated
construction cost per district per year. The average
geotechnical change order amount per district per year
was 10.25 percent of the average amount of total
change orders per district per year. The average net
overrun due to geotechnical change orders was
$707,000 per district per year. About 28 percent of
the contracts that were considered in this study
experienced geotechnical change orders. Out of the
300 contracts examined, 84 contracts experienced
geotechnical change orders. In total, 158 geotechnical
change orders were recorded in all the contracts. Out of
the 84 contracts that experienced geotechnical change
orders, there were 64 road contracts, 16 bridge
contracts and 4 resurfacing projects.46 contracts (out
of the 84 contracts that underwent geotechnical change
orders) experienced only one geotechnical change
order, while 24 contracts experienced 2 geotechnical
change orders. About 41% of the total road contracts

(155 contracts) experienced geotechnical change orders.
About 37% of the total bridge contracts (44 contracts)
experienced geotechnical change orders. The other
contract types of this study’s dataset were insignificant
as far as geotechnical change orders were concerned.
Reason code 206 – Constructability: Soils-Related –
was assigned to 101 geotechnical change orders. Reason
code 405 – Changed Field Conditions: Soils-Related –
was assigned to 46 geotechnical change orders. Reason
code 108 – Errors and Omissions: Soils-Related – was
assigned to the 11 remaining geotechnical change
orders. When compared to the total number of items
that underwent change due to Errors and Omissions in
all change orders (637), the occurrence of errors and
omissions in geotechnical change orders is relatively
low, which is a positive sign.
The descriptive statistics presented in this Chapter
were useful in obtaining a fair picture of the geotechnical change order scene in Indiana. From the data
presented in this Chapter, relatively problematic areas
in terms of districts and reasons for change orders were
identified in order to progress towards prevention or
better management of change orders.
CHAPTER 6. INTERVIEWS
6.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, we observed the trends in
geotechnical change order data. Though the data
reflects where the geotechnical change orders are
concentrated, it is important to seek additional
information from personnel involved with change
orders on a regular basis, for two reasons:
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1.

2.

The information on the contract documents was not
sufficient to capture accurately the typical reasons for
geotechnical change orders. This was mainly due to reason
codes that portray causes for change orders at a superficial level.
Any amount of data may not compensate for the field
experiences of personnel who have dealt with and
continue to deal with change orders on a day-to-day basis.

Thus, in keeping with the objectives of the project,
interviews were conducted with ten INDOT project
engineers and four geotechnical design consultants who
were involved with geotechnical change orders or
change orders associated with soil-related items that
were part of the contracts covered in the dataset. Since
these contracts were completed a few years prior to the
time of the interview, the change orders being even
further in the past, the interviewees were mostly not
able to recollect specific change orders. However, due
to their continued experience with change orders, they
were able to narrow down on typical causes for
geotechnical change orders. Also, a few interviewees
were able to discuss the general quality control methods
at INDOT and their improvement. We thank these
project engineers (current or former INDOT staff) and
geotechnical consultants for spending their time in
patiently sharing their experiences with us. In this
chapter, we shall look into the vital information
obtained from the interviews conducted.
6.2. Interviews with Project Engineers
6.2.1. Questions
Before looking at all the opinions and experiences
shared by different interviewees, we shall first describe
the basis for selection of particular projects and
respective project engineers for the interviews and the
typical questions put forward to them. The top four or
five contracts, in terms of the geotechnical change
orders as a percentage of the total construction cost,
were chosen from each of the six districts. From these
contracts, the INDOT project engineers who worked
on the contracts were identified and their contact
information was obtained from the district offices.
Interviews were conducted either in person or via
telephone depending on the availability of the engineers. Prior to the interview, the interviewees were
presented with an overview of the project and a typical
questionnaire that was sent to them via e-mail. Along
with it the change order information for the particular
project in contention was also provided. The essential
questions, in a condensed form, that were part of the
questionnaire were:
1.

2.

44

What were the geotechnical reasons for each of the
change orders on the project? How were they managed?
How could they have been foreseen / prevented?
How would you rate the geotechnical work done on the
project with respect to site investigation, treatment of wet
or soft subgrade, foundation design, appropriateness of

3.

4.

design methods, QA/QC procedures? Would you attribute change order occurrence to deficiencies in any of the
above procedures? If so, how better could the work have
been performed?
In your experience have you observed a specific trend in
geotechnical change orders? Have specific reasons come
up very often? Are particular project types – Road, Bridge,
Maintenance, Traffic or Resurfacing – or particular
districts most affected by geotechnical change orders?
What would be your suggestions to INDOT in order to
minimize the occurrence of change orders? Provide any
other information or opinions that you may feel is
relevant.

Based on their answers to these questions further
relevant questions of greater depth, were asked
depending on the progression of the conversation. As
mentioned earlier, due to the fact that most of these
change orders had occurred a few years previously, the
project engineers found it very difficult to recollect and
reproduce exact situations and reasons behind them.
Hence, their answers tended to be more general and
based on their observations and experiences from all
the projects they had worked in and not particular to
the change orders from a particular contract.
6.2.2. Answers
Now, we shall look at all the answers, opinions,
statements and suggestions from the project engineers
who were interviewed. Considering that our objective is
to only improve on change order management for the
future, and in order to keep the identities of interviewees secure, we will refer to them as Project
Engineers A, B and so on. The change orders described
could be due to geotechnical reasons or may be due to
other reasons and involve soil-related items recorded as
part of the change order.
Project Engineer A
Project Engineer A’s answers only addressed the one
particular contract, where he was the project engineer,
for which the change order information was provided
to him. This was a road contract where there were a
couple of change orders that were pertaining to
geotechnical work. Project Engineer A recollected that
the major change order in terms of cost overruns from
this project was from the treatment of poor subgrade
soil. The necessity for soil treatment was identified in
the plans. It was also planned that the existing
pavement would be recycled in order to provide the
fill material once the undercutting was performed on
the poor subgrade soil. However, the recycled material
from the existing pavement was found to be short and
would not be sufficient to fill the undercut volume
beneath. Hence a large amount of money was involved
in purchasing new #53 stone in order to be able to fill
this remaining undercut zone. The shortage of fill
material was close to 70,000 tonnes, and the major cost
overrun was due to the need to purchase new stone to
fill the undercut portion.
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According to Project Engineer A, this error in
design was unique to this project and is not very
common. It could have been prevented if the designers
had made a reasonable estimate of the amount of
recycled fill they would obtain from the existing
pavement and whether it would be sufficient for
filling the undercut volume. The designers would have
to adopt better methods to predict more exact
amounts of recycled material that would be available
for use in the new project.
Another source of change orders in this project was
from erosion control. The quantities proposed by
designers were insufficient. Extra amounts of rip-rap
and geotextiles were required in order to protect the
existing pipelines; this was not accounted for in the
initial plan, as mentioned Project Engineer A.
Project Engineer B
Project Engineer B spoke about the change orders
with respect to geotechnical work on a road contract
which he was involved in, which had significant
geotechnical change order amounts. The main source
of change orders on this project was due to the extra
excavation that needed to be carried out along the
length of the project. The contractors were provided the
bench mark elevation with the datum of measurement
being 6 inches off where it should have been. Hence, a
length of 37,000 yards needed to be excavated with this
depth; this resulted in a large cost overrun in the
project. That was considered a very rare error that cost
the extra money needed to pay off the excavation costs.
This is again very unique to this project and not what
one would expect very often.
In addition to the change order mentioned above,
bridge rails were constructed along the length of a
bridge in the project. The designs indicated that the rain
water would collect along these bridge rails. But as
water across the bridge flowed into the rails, it ran-off
towards the end of the bridge and, at this location, the
designs did not make any arrangement to collect this
water that runs off to the end of the bridge rails. Thus,
rip-raps and geotextiles needed to be placed in order to
handle this drainage of water towards the end of the
bridge, with flat drainage lines near the edge. This
change order could have been easily prevented by a
design that considered a very certain necessity of the
project, Project Engineer B remarked.
Project Engineer B explained that there were also
change orders related to piling on this project. The
piling quantities from the Pile Driving Analyzer (PDA)
testing on the test pile did not match the actual
requirements. During pile driving it was found that the
results were underestimated on the test pile driving. The
design pile quantities did not match the actual pile
driving quantities that were used in the field. Hence,
there were cost overruns to manage this problem.
Project Engineer B also recollected that during this
project questions were raised regarding the effectiveness
or accuracy of the PDA testing.

Project Engineer C
Project Engineer C discussed the geotechnical work
and the change orders from his project, which was
shortlisted based on change order amounts. Here, it
was seen that though the change orders involved
geotechnical work including excavation, aggregate
and geotextiles, all the changes were due to a scope
change from a Local Agency Request, as described by
the reason code. The changes were mostly due to
political reasons and had no geotechnical background.
Hence, Project Engineer C resorted to answering the
questions from a more general point of view based on his
experiences with geotechnical change orders in various
other projects. He cited erosion control as one of the
major reasons that demanded that change orders be
recorded, very frequently. Also, he mentioned that
insufficient site investigation tended to be a very
important reason for geotechnical change orders, in the
projects he had worked on. Especially in contracts that
are ‘shelved’ for a long time, he felt that the site
investigation was typically done far too ahead of the
construction period which resulted in lot of changed field
conditions. For rectifying this problem, he suggested that
for projects that are shelved, a secondary site investigation needed to be done to make sure there are no changes
from the initial conditions. Also, Project Engineer C felt
that designers lacked knowledge of field conditions a lot
of times and tended to work with maps and old plans,
which were not reflective of actual field conditions. This,
according to him, was a reason for geotechnical change
orders. Mismatch in piling quantities was also an issue
to be addressed, he expressed. He also said that road
projects that spanned over several miles tended to
produce the most number of change orders.
With regards to the soil treatment methods usually
used, Project Engineer C felt that it was more important
to adhere to experience rather than to specifications
when it came to treatment of poor subgrade soil. The
method of treatment for a particular condition would
be better determined at the site, rather than by using
specifications, which may not cover or account for the
various conditions that prevail on the project.
Project Engineer D
Project Engineer D reviewed the change orders for a
road project where the change order amounts for
geotechnical work were relatively high. He was on the
project only for half the duration of the contract and,
hence, addressed only the change orders that occurred
during that time.
Project Engineer D recollected that for soil treatment, a special provision was included in the contract
to allow the crushing of recycled concrete pavement
into stone for filling undercuts. The contractor was
initially going to use this option but eventually decided
against it as he felt that it would not be cost effective
considering that there was abundant availability of #53
stone in the area that could be used for filling the
undercut locations. Also, there was another change
order involving aggregate amounts which was due to a
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change in scope on the project and, the reasons were
not geotechnical, quoted Project Engineer D. The
project was designed so that a portion of an intersection
with a city street would be built along with the street.
However, during construction it made more sense to
construct it right away and so it was decided to extend
the embankment and build the entire intersection with
the project. This resulted in extra aggregate, embankment and subbase. Also, as far as other change orders
with geotechnical items, he recollected that a special
provision required guardrail in certain ditches. The
road plans did not include quantities of riprap for these
and, hence, a change order was recorded for this.
Overall, Project Engineer D felt that geotechnical issues
were not crucial in this project and that the change
orders associated with them were well handled. In
general, he indicated that geotechnical change orders
are not very problematic in his experience. In order to
avoid some of them, extensive site investigation might
be a solution but he was not sure what the ‘‘cost-benefit
ratio’’ would amount to and was of the opinion that
mostly it might be cheaper to pay for overlooked items
rather than spend more on more intensive testing.
Project Engineer E
Project engineer E dealt with a road project that
included very high amounts associated with geotechnical change orders. This contract was handled by local
agencies and was not under the direct supervision of
the State. He mentioned that geotechnical change
orders were the most difficult to handle on the project.
Great time and effort was spent to ensure that the
change orders were detailed sufficiently so all parties
knew the conditions and responsibilities included in the
work.
There were four geotechnical change orders on the
project. The first geotechnical change order was for the
deletion of the planned Dynamic Compaction item and
it reimbursed the contractor for eligible charges
incurred. The second geotechnical change order was
for the removal/replacement method of subgrade
improvement adopted on this project. The third
geotechnical change order was for a geogrid change
and addition of an item for #2 stone to be used in the
undercut area. The fourth geotechnical change order
was concerning settling a claim for some of the
geotechnical work performed on the project in cold
weather and for payment for #53 gravel and stone used
by the contractor.
Project Engineer E described in detail each of the
change orders and the background behind their occurrences. While describing the change orders, Project
Engineer E also covered the techniques and processes
adopted in the work. Though they might be irrelevant to
the reasons causing the change orders, the approaches
towards site investigation and quality control, as
described by Project Engineer E are quoted here, and
this is a good chance to capture some of the methods
adopted in INDOT contracts. Along with this, we shall
describe his explanations of the change orders one by one.
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The site investigation for the project was carried out
by a geotechnical firm that recommended dynamic
compaction in order to reduce the voids in the soil
caused due to the broken concrete slabs that had been
dumped for several years, and thus reduce settlement.
Accordingly, the firm wrote the Special Provisions for
dynamic compaction and this was included in the
Special Provisions for the contract. These Special
Provisions gave very specific directions as to how
dynamic compaction was to be carried out and the
measures to be taken for ensuring good results with
dynamic compaction. The subcontractor in charge of
dynamic compaction had to submit a work plan that
had to be checked for agreement with the Special
Provisions prepared.
The pre-dynamic compaction soil borings and SPT
samples were obtained by another geotechnical consulting firm. Water levels at the borings were measured and
the buildings in the surrounding area were recorded on
video to document existing conditions. A seismograph
was used to record vibrations during dynamic compaction. Dynamic compaction was performed in the area –
40’ drop height, five to seven drops on an eight-inch grid.
After dynamic compaction was completed in the test
area, soil borings were made and SPT samples were
obtained again. Water levels were measured again. The
results pre-compaction and post-compaction were compared. The results post compaction did not meet the
standard criterion – average SPT N- value of 20 blows
per foot with N-values not less than 15 blows per foot.
Hence, a second test area was chosen and the method of
dynamic compaction was revised to a 50’ drop, eight
drops on an eight-inch grid. Pre-dynamic compaction
soil borings were done in this new test area, followed by
dynamic compaction, followed by post dynamic compaction soil borings. The criterion was not met again.
The relevant authorities and personnel on the project
met in order to review the work and assess the situation.
The decision was made to use the more conventional
method of removal and replacement. Hence, the first
geotechnical change order deleted the item for dynamic
compaction, but recorded reimbursement of allowable
charges incurred by the contractor.
The geotechnical firm that prescribed dynamic
compaction declined to carry out the undercutting and
replacement of the poor quality fill. Hence, a different
firm was hired to carry out this work. This firm
identified that two of the four borings taken by the
initially appointed company did not extend in to the
native material and hence additional soil borings and
tests were performed. The recommendations included
1.22 m removal of soil in the cut and fill sections. The
1.22 m undercut was from the plan subgrade elevation in
the cut sections and from the existing ground elevation
in the fill sections. #53 gravel was used in the fill section,
undercut to within 1.216 m of the subgrade. The top
1.216 m was 0.608 m of #53 Stone on 0.608 m of #53
gravel for both cut and fill sections. Geogrids and
geotextile were placed on the bottom of the undercut for
cut and fill sections and at the existing ground elevation
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on the fill section. Pneumatic Settlement Cells and a
Pneumatic Standpipe Piezometer were added at the
request of INDOT Geotechnical office to monitor
settlement in the fill section. Settlement plates were also
used to monitor the settlement. The second geotechnical
change order included costs for the additional construction required by this revised method of construction.
The removal and replacement Geotechnical Report
specified Tensar BX1200 or equivalent geogrid usage.
The author of the report later approved any Type 1
Geogrid from INDOT’s list of approved materials.
INDOT Geotechnical division denied the change in the
first place and asked for the original geogrid type to be
used. Thus, the third change order created a specific
item of geogrid for Tensar BX1200. Also, there was an
extremely wet area where #2 stone was used to stabilize
the grade and an item for #2 stone was also added onto
this change order.
The project was constructed as planned with the
exception of Hot Mix Asphalt (HMA) surfacing work,
during a particular year. Accordingly, HMA surfacing
and some other miscellaneous work would be completed in the Spring of the following year. This was
recommended in the consultants’ subgrade recommendation report. The unit price for HMA Surface and
HMA for Sidewalk and a few other items was increased
to reflect the price increase for work originally planned
to be completed in the previous year, but would now be
done during the following Spring. INDOT agreed to
pay the contractor for cold weather work, up-charge for
HMA intermediate that was not placed in the previous
year and also agreed to pay plan quantities for the #53
gravel and #53 stone items on this project. All these
items were included in the fourth change order. This is
an example of a change order in geotechnical work,
which was not due to geotechnical reasons.
Despite the heavy increase in costs due to the change
order concerning subgrade treatment using dynamic
compaction, Project Engineer E was of the opinion that
sometimes such change orders are inevitable. In the
report prepared by the firm that suggested dynamic
compaction, the following was mentioned, according to
Project Engineer E - ‘‘The most reliable construction
method for this roadway would be to remove and
replace the existing fill……this option of construction
would be costly. Therefore, it is recommended that the
site be improved by dynamic compaction…’’ Hence, he
feels that they went with a less conservative approach
than the one they had in hand but it did not work out in
this case. The geotechnical firm felt that the acceptance
criteria were unachievable and claimed that,
‘‘Improvement of such soils using Dynamic compaction
will be limited. The criteria in the Special Provisions
should be waived and the dynamic compaction be
accepted on the basis of a three-inch difference in crater
depth on successive drops of the weight,’’ stated Project
Engineer E. This recommendation was denied and the
removal and replacement method was followed. As far
as the QA/QC procedures for this change order is
concerned, Project Engineer E recollected that they had

inspectors in place all the time to ensure specifications
of the Special Provisions were met since INDOT rarely
carries out dynamic compaction.
In general, Project Engineer E felt that there is always
some amount of uncertainty associated with underground work and hence the most common approach
would be to proceed with the plans as long as possible
and then deal with the changes when they are
encountered. However, he felt that when changes occur,
decisions need to be made as fast as possible and the
changes managed quickly. He mentioned that due to the
quick handling of changes on this project, the cost
increase was considerably cut down. Also, he stated that
he would expect most changes to occur on long road
projects, due to subgrade issues, and in bridge piling.
Project Engineer F
Project Engineer F was contacted based on the
relatively high amount of geotechnical change order
amounts on a road contract he worked on. He confessed
that the contract was too far in the past for him to
recollect exact details from it. However he tried to
narrate some of the issues on the project and also spoke
about some of the other contracts where he encountered
geotechnical changes. We will look at his answers and
opinions, reported from a first person view:
According to Project Engineer F, ‘‘Geotechnical issues
were not the dominant reason for change orders (on this
contract). There was a need for change orders to address
undercutting of poor soil and the placement of 53
compacted aggregate at various locations. These locations were determined by proof rolling (loaded tri-axle
truck). INDOT’s specifications address this situation on
how the related payment will be handled and how to
check for proper subgrade strength. However, there are
times when this situation can become difficult to solve if
the area of poor soil is deep and large. Then, undercutting and replacement with #53 stone may not be the
most cost effective method of correction. INDOT’s
Geotechnical Section in Indianapolis is then consulted to
seek additional advice to find a more cost-effective
solution.’’
Project Engineer F also mentioned that ‘‘Basically,
we had many areas of the subgrade that failed proof
rolling due to poor soils - gray soft soil, and
deteriorating vegetation, such as wood. Most of these
areas were corrected using 1 foot or less of undercut
and replacement with #53 stone. The costs associated
with the correction work were those for additional
excavation and placement of #53 Stone.’’
On addressing the problem of geotechnical change
orders, Project Engineer F stated that ‘‘My experience
has been that often, not enough soil borings are taken or
that the soil borings are not taken in the appropriate
locations. I believe INDOT should have more oversight
on the locations of the soil borings. Also, there are times
when a particular type of subgrade treatment would be
more appropriate for certain types of existing soils. As an
example, Project Engineer F recalled another contract
that was constructed a couple of years ago which called
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for Type IV treatment - 9 inches of subgrade excavated
and replaced with coarse aggregate #53 on geogrid. This
was a bad choice because the majority of the soil on this
jobsite was red clay that was soft (wet). Therefore, the
planned subgrade treatment was not sufficient to correct
the soft clay soil problem. Project Engineer F mentioned,
he believed that the best method would have been Type I
(with only the 16 inch chemical soil modification).
Instead, the contractors ended up undercutting large
volumes of soil and backfilling with #53 stone and shot
rock (large rock of various sizes that is the result of
blasting in the rock quarry).
On being asked about the appropriateness of
specifications and guidelines, Project Engineer F said,
‘‘INDOT specifications, guidelines and testing requirements are sufficient. I would like to see the DCP
(Dynamic Cone Penetration) be allowed on all soil
testing. More timely results are achieved in the field
with this method.’’
When asked about the change orders he had
encountered which he felt could have been foreseen
and, hence, been avoided, he said, ‘‘On a large road
contract such as this, INDOT expects change orders for
geotechnical issues because the existing site conditions
are going to vary throughout the jobsite, and these
variations are very difficult to find prior to excavating
the area. However, the poor soil has to be removed.
Considering INDOT expects poor soil to be encountered on a contract of this size, an estimated quantity
could have been included in the original bid for the
contract to reduce the amount of change order cost
associated with geotechnical issues. The reason for
frequently encountering poor subgrade soil, in some
cases, may be due to the fact that not enough soil
borings are taken to correctly identify all the issues on a
jobsite.’’ Project Engineer F also indicated that he is
currently working on a contract that will require a
change order for a large overrun in rock excavation
because soil borings were not taken in a large cut
section of the jobsite (all the cut was expected to be soil,
but instead a large part is rock). Project Engineer F
mentioned that soil borings taken at this cut section
should have identified this issue prior to letting and
thus, eliminated the need for a change order.
On the dependence of geotechnical change orders on
contract type and location, Project Engineer F
remarked, ‘‘The locations of contracts do present
different geotechnical issues. Some areas have a greater
chance for rock, some peat, some soft clay, some
springs, some silt. Mostly, contracts involving complete
new pavement sections will involve geotechnical change
orders. Usually, only the bridge work ends up being as
planned.’’
As suggestions for preventing geotechnical change
orders, Project Engineer F mentioned the following:
1.

2.
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‘‘Undistributed quantities could be included in the
contract at the time of bid to cover some of the estimated
geotechnical issues that are highly likely to occur.
Unit prices should be established against other bidders as
they are normally more favorable to INDOT than

3.

4.

5.

establishing a unit price after the letting, with no other
bidders being involved.
For the subgrade issues, better performance is required
when it comes to soil borings. Some planned quantity for
removal and replacement of poor soil encountered
should be included because this problem should be
expected based upon the history of the work. More care
is required with the choice of the subgrade treatment type
based upon the region of the state and the associated soil
types expected.’’
The location of a contract needs to raise some ‘‘red flags’’
while conducting geotechnical investigations. Different
approaches need to be adopted at different regions of the
state.
A check list could be developed, including all the possible
problems, and used during the design process. The check
list could be developed based upon change order issues
that repeatedly occur and be based upon the region of the
work as certain issues arise in one region, but do not in
another.’’

Project Engineer G
Project Engineer G spoke about the change orders in a
road contract that was part of the dataset considered in
this study. His answers were mostly specific to this one
contract, though he provided a few suggestions based on
other experiences. He mentioned that the geotechnical
change orders were relatively easy to process and explain
for this contract. Most were errors and omissions in the
original quantities or in the items added, such as riprap
and geotextiles used with riprap, all to stabilize areas
subject to erosion. We will briefly look into his
descriptions of each change order on the project.
One change order was concerned with temporary
erosion and sediment control. The relevant items for
this work were shown in the erosion control plan, but
were not included in the proposal of pay items. Thus,
this change order dealt with including these items. In
another change order, an item for B-Borrow for
structure backfill was decreased and another item of
aggregate was added. The contractor preferred to fill
three box structures with #12 aggregate over using #23
sand. The specifications currently allow for aggregate
to be used as backfill. The B-Borrow for the structure
backfill would have had to be placed in six-inch lifts
and compacted, while the #12 aggregate could be
placed in 12-inch lifts. This was purely a constructability-based issue.
Project Engineer G mentioned that in another
change order, revetment riprap and geotextiles, to go
with the riprap, were added for usage at several
locations where the necessity was felt. Bituminous
curbs were removed to direct the flow of water at a river
bank and at steep areas of the bank, there was a need
for erosion control. Use of revetment riprap was
adopted as the logical solution and extra revetment
riprap was included through change orders, especially
behind one guardrail and the rest for areas that
required erosion control.
Project Engineer G indicated that a change order
dealt with the extra #53 aggregate required due to a
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possible error in calculation of quantities. This change
order also included further addition of riprap for usage
along the banks of a river. One more change order was
associated with wrong calculations on aggregate
quantities, due to not accounting for an area of
excavation and backfilling.
A change order was recorded for the placement of an
erosion control blanket for a slope that required a good
stand of vegetation. A good stand of grass with
minimal erosion problems was achieved as a result.
Also, a final change order was associated with an
underrun in subgrade treatment quantities from the
plan, possibly from an error in calculation.
These were the descriptions of each of the change
orders involving geotechnical items, as provided by
Project Engineer G. He also provided some general
views on geotechnical change orders. He felt that a lot
of change orders occurred with respect to subgrade
treatment on rehabilitation and new jobs. One point
which he strongly emphasized on was that the reason
codes were not always most appropriate for use and
that it is often very difficult to determine which reason
code to use for each change order. Project Engineer G
stated that change orders are inevitably going to be
written on most contracts and that he felt that
geotechnical issues were fairly well-covered as far as
preventing change orders is concerned. He mentioned
that riprap and aggregate quantities never matched the
ones on the plan. Project Engineer G stressed on the
fact that it would be much wiser to rectify a bad
situation while a contract is active rather than let
INDOT Maintenance come back to work on it because
then it would be 100 percent State funded. When asked
about frequent reasons for change orders and dependence on project types and location, Project Engineer G
commented that mismatch in quantities, especially
those related to riprap and aggregate, was a frequent
issue. He said that he had worked only in Greenfield,
and considering that this district strives to deliver high
quality jobs, change orders are going to be part and
parcel of these contracts. In his opinion, large road
projects and rehabilitation projects are most prone to
change orders.
Project Engineer G also mentioned that increase in
the minimum amount that warrants the recording of a
change order would decrease the number of change
orders. However, the fact that change orders now need
to be operation specific means that he expects a greater
number of change orders.
Project Engineer H
Project Engineer H discussed the change orders from
a road project he worked on that was part of the
dataset considered in this study. He spoke about some
of the issues he could recollect from the project and also
provided his views on geotechnical change orders in
general.
According to Project Engineer H, the majority of the
geotechnical overruns where due to the addition of 2
miles of passing lanes added under one change order.

All of the area was in a fill-cut section, with the existing
fill and a new fill added to get the desired lane width.
Project Engineer H mentioned that this change order
was due to political reasons. This change came up
during the course of the project and it could not have
been foreseen or prevented. According to him, this was
one more change order involving geotechnical items
that did not occur due to geotechnical reasons.
Project Engineer H indicated that the second area of
increase was due to the necessity of realignment of the
pavement due to political reasons again. There was a
large cut area at the sub grade which was very soft
material and it was determined that it would be cheaper
to remove 18 inches of soil and treat chemically rather
than undercutting and replacing with B-Borrow soil.
In another change order mentioned by Project
Engineer H, turn lanes and passing lanes were to be
added. A temporary pavement was to be constructed to
allow traffic flow. However, for some reason the plans
indicated that the soil under the temporary lane had to
be treated but there was no soil treatment prescribed for
the permanent pavement that was being constructed.
According to him, it made no sense to treat the soil for
the temporary lane and not treat it for the permanent
lane considering that they were really close to each
other and that the soil was pretty much the same. The
temporary lane was going to be stripped off anyway in
three months’ time. Thus, a new order was made to
treat the soil under the main permanent pavement as
well. Due to cheaper costs of treating the soil up to 18
inch depth rather than under-cutting the entire layer
and replacing with B-Borrow, soil treatment methods
were adopted. Lime-flyash stabilization was used to
treat the soil. This has been a very productive method
that has been observed to yield very good results in his
experience, stated Project Engineer H. For the quality
control of soil treatment, fly ash was obtained after it
was tested in the laboratory. He opined that the need
for this change order was probably due to the lack of
sufficient site investigation and faulty design plans. He
said he didn’t know who performed the site investigation, but suggested site investigation should have
certainly been short. According to him, in most such
cases, the designers cannot be blamed because they just
follow the pavement design plans they are provided
with.
In Project Engineer H’s experience, there have been
issues with site investigation. There were projects which
he worked on where the undercutting had to be
increased more than 200% due to insufficient site
investigation. According to him, there was the need for
sudden soil treatment or unexpected ditches, pipes,
tanks, garbage dumps that were encountered and had
to be dealt with during the construction of the projects.
Project Engineer H explained that generally change
orders could be prevented by cultivating the right
attitude. Change orders basically crop up due to
attempts made at the planning stage to cut down on
costs excessively and, eventually, when the construction
begins, it is found that things which were planned and
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had to be compromised on for the sake of cost-cutting
need to be eventually done anyway and, hence, there
are change orders. ‘‘A sound plan that does not risk any
unnecessary compromises should help in cutting down
change orders,’’ said Project Engineer H.
Project Engineer I
Project Engineer I provided a very brief summary of
the problems encountered in his contract, which was
included in the data for this study. Due to constraints
of time and availability more information could not be
obtained from Project Engineer I.
He mentioned that on this road contract, some of the
change orders recorded, including geotechnical items,
were from quantity issues due to replacement of
Grated-Box End Sections to Pipe-End Sections because
the Grated-Box End Sections, which are more expensive, were not required to meet the clear zone and safety
requirements. He indicated that this did not exactly
qualify under geotechnical reasons but was recorded
with geotechnical items. Also, there were issues on the
project with respect to flattening the foreslopes as
planned due to:
1.
2.

At places, the right of way was insufficient to move the
back slope.
Where right of way was sufficient, the subsoil was so
granular that once the turf was removed, preventing the
slope from sliding before it could be encased was a
challenge.
Project Engineer I also mentioned that he encountered
many problems with elevations given on the plans in this
contract. This led to a lot of cases where the plans
indicated filling of ditches which had pipes, and this
immediately resulted in flooding of adjacent property.
Quite a few changes occurred due to similar problems with
elevations, recollected Project Engineer I.

Project Engineer J
Due to his inability to recollect issues from the
contract and explain situations better than the contract
documents, Project Engineer J preferred to discuss the
problem of geotechnical change orders in a general
way, based on his varied experiences on several
contracts. We shall now describe briefly his experiences
with frequently occurring geotechnical problems on
INDOT construction contracts and the procedures,
specifications and QA/QC methods associated with
these problems.
The most common problem that caused geotechnical
change orders, in his experience, was the subgrade
treatment problem. He observed that there are rarely
any issues with the foundation design as these are
carried out exactly as how the designs specify them to
be and there is not much scope for change. Typical
change order problems would be for dealing with poor
subgrade. In the case of poor subgrade conditions the
specifications provide two options, said Project
Engineer J:
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1.

2.

Undercutting about 1 foot of the soft layer and replacing
it with generally #2 stone or #8 coarse aggregate (some
cases #53).
Lime stabilization for about 16 inches to strengthen poor
soils.

According to Project Engineer J, the first option was
the more popular one until about five years ago.
However, he felt that this is not the most effective way
to deal with the problem. He said, ‘‘Just replacing about
one foot of the soil with stone or coarse aggregate on
top of the remaining poor soil really does not tackle the
problem effectively. Nowadays, lime stabilization is
more popular and is a more effective way of overcoming poor subgrade problems.’’
He continued saying, ‘‘Now, once the subgrade has
been treated by either method, the specifications require
that the soil is compacted to a specified density and that
a DCPT criterion is satisfied. A certain count for the
DCP should be reached for the first six inches of
penetration and for the subsequent six inches. This is a
standard count and it would be much better if the count
was specified more accurately for every soil type that
existed on the field, as the count tends to vary quite a bit
for different types of soils. Traditionally, once the
specifications are met, ‘‘proof-rolling’’ is done. This is a
process where a fully-loaded tri-axle truck is driven
across the soil to check if it withstands the truck load.
Project Engineer J mentioned that it is very often seen
that even though the specifications were met, the
subgrade fails under the truck load. This necessitates
further subgrade treatment, and results in change orders
and, eventually, a cost increase. Project Engineer J
indicated that the specifications should probably be
sounder in this regard to prevent such change orders.
Project Engineer J also remarked, ‘‘INDOT generally
prefers to deal with this issue and pay for it through
change orders, rather than give any freedom to the
contractors for subgrade treatment. This is because
giving too much of freedom in this regard to the
contractor would result in the latter treating much more
soil than required and, hence, billing INDOT at a
greater cost. Instead, INDOT prefers to let the
contractor go on the field, meet the problem of poor
soil in that location, make a change order and then
treat the poor soils at those specific locations.’’
With regards to the solution for such problems
Project Engineer J said, ‘‘A lot of these subgrade
problems could be prevented if the site investigation
was expanded further. Whether the cost input into
more intense site investigation would be repaid by
preventing late detection of poor subgrade soil is
questionable. This is because the nature of occurrence
of poor soil is very random, and more robust site
investigation may yet fail to eliminate this problem.’’
Project Engineer J also felt that some geotechnical
change orders occur due to the lack of ability on the part
of the designer to think ‘‘three-dimensionally’’. They fail
to recognize the actual field conditions, either due to the
insufficient details provided to them or plain lack of
identification with the situations of that particular site.
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Another common issue that Project Engineer J has
come across a few times is pertaining to MSE
(Mechanically Stabilized Earth) wall construction.
Project Engineer J gave the example of projects where a
highway is reconstructed to widen existing pavement
lanes, with the MSE walls built on the edges of the new
highway. He mentioned that in most cases, the MSE wall
configuration coincides with the drainage lanes, as they
were located just past the boundary of the original
highway. According to Project Engineer J, the specifications provide no information as to how to deal with such
a problem, and this issue is never included in the plans.
Thus, in the field, a lot of change orders result when
drainage lines need to be eventually handled, observed
Project Engineer J. Project Engineer J also called
attention to the fact that the presence of ditches by the
side of the original highway is an indication that there will
be the need for treatment of the marshy soil that generally
tends to be found there and that not many prior
allowances are made for the stabilization or undercutting
and replacement of the poor soils at these locations.
Project Engineer J indicated that another common
reason for geotechnical change orders is in the case of
pile driving for bridges. Project Engineer J feels that the
development of the PDA testing is certainly an
improvement because previously piles used to get over
driven, with additional stresses being applied to the
piles. He mentioned that quantities that are prescribed
at the planning stage for pile driving are always off the
actual values that are needed in the field. According to
him, in the field, all the pile driving is done based on the
results of the test pile driven into the ground and the
PDA testing, while the prescribed values from design
are obtained through soil borings done on the site
during the planning stage; these two results hardly ever
match, leading to change orders most of the time.
Specifications must look to address this issue in the case
of bridge projects, he observed.
According to Project Engineer J, additional sources
of geotechnical change orders were erosion control
measures that are added during the course of a contract
and designs and cost estimates that never account for
the existing pipes that run across the field and that
invariable need to be protected using geotextiles and riprap (these are used to protect the pipes and manage the
drainage pits often composed of very poor, marshy soil).
The important information from all the interviewees
is summarized below in brief in Table 6.1.
In this section, we looked into all the information
provided by each of the project engineers who were
interviewed. In the next section, we will describe the
view on geotechnical change orders of geotechnical
consultants who have worked on INDOT construction
contracts.
6.3. Interviews with Geotechnical Consultants
In order to obtain a different perspective of the
problem of geotechnical change orders at INDOT,
geotechnical design consultants, who work on INDOT

projects, were also interviewed. Since these consultants
perform crucial tasks, such as site investigation and soil
testing, and provide the collected information to
designers, their input was considered important in
order to converge on practical solutions. They provided
their views, comments and suggestions on the problem
of geotechnical change orders. Again, in keeping with
the format followed until now, we will refer to each
person as Consultant A, B and so on.
6.3.1. Answers from Geotechnical Consultants
Consultant A
Consultant A representing a geotechnical firm that
performs consultancy for INDOT projects, provided
briefly, his opinion on geotechnical change orders.
Initially Consultant A spoke about site investigation
performed by consultants in INDOT projects. He said
that they performed site investigation sometimes while
INDOT did it on other occasions and that this
generally varies with INDOT’s policy for each particular contract. He mentioned that apart from the
standard borings and soil testing, his firm also visits the
site several times and couples the data collected with
the knowledge from aerial maps and topographic
surveys in order to identify problem soils in the field.
He also discussed the possibility of compromises being
made sometimes in site investigation for cost-cutting,
which could eventually lead to change orders during
construction. The typical deficiencies in site investigation, according to him, can be insufficient boreholes,
lack of sufficient knowledge about site conditions on
the part of the investigator and failure to optimize
the effort input and channel it to the correct areas in
the field – this would happen as a result of good
background studies that would help prediction
of problematic areas where boreholes could be
concentrated.
Consultant A also discussed some other issues that
may cause geotechnical change orders, in his opinion.
He felt that design consultants tended to overlook some
recommendations made by geotechnical consultants as
in many occasions there were issues on the field that
created change orders, and when the reasons were
tracked back, the conclusions were that suitable
recommendations had already been made by the
geotechnical consultants but that the design consultants
for some reason failed to take them into account. Also,
consultant A was of the opinion that the contractors
needed to be dealt with a more stubborn approach and
not be treated softly always. He suggested that sometimes there is ‘‘a false sense of security’’ between the
geotechnical and design consultants, with the former
trusting the latter to take into account certain issues
and handle them and vice versa. Consultant A said that
in many situations neither party covers all areas
completely, leaving loop holes for change orders to
enter. Thus, this lack of communication between
geotechnical and design consultants, according to
him, causes change orders in many cases.
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TABLE 6.1
Salient information from Interviews with INDOT Project Engineers
Personnel Involved
Project Engineer A

Reason for Change Order

Remarks

In subgrade treatment, quantities of recycled pavement
that would be generated for use in filling undercut portions,
were overestimated.

Shortage of close to 70,000 tonnes of fill material.
Overruns due to purchase of #53 stone.

Erosion control and protection of existing pipelines
was required.
Faulty benchmark elevation was used for calculating the
quantities along length of road.

Riprap and geotextiles were purchased.

Drainage set up was not included in design to collect water
running off from bridge rails

Riprap and geotextiles were used. Issue should have
been predicted in design.

Piling quantities obtained from design did not match
the ones on the field.

Accuracy of PDA testing and design quantities needs to
be improved.

Project Engineer C

——

Project Engineer D

Recycled pavement usage for filling undercut portions
was prescribed in design despite abundant availability of
aggregate at the site. This would have proven uneconomical

General Remarks:
Mismatch in piling quantities need to be reduced
‘Shelved’ projects should have a secondary site
investigation
Recycled pavement could be used when there is no
aggregate availability on the site.

Project Engineer B

Project Engineer E

Project Engineer F

Project Engineer G

Project Engineer H
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Overrun due to extra excavation of 6 inches needed
along 37,000 yards.

Extra soil-related items due to scope change in construction
of an intersection

——

Riprap not included for special provision made for
guardrails in places with ditches
For subgrade treatment, dynamic compaction was initially
prescribed. After failure, undercutting and filling was
adopted. Two change orders were recorded for this.

——

Geogrid type was changed. For an area of poor subgrade,
undercutting and filling was done.

——

Hot-Mix Asphalt work was delayed and contractor was
compensated for some extra items and cold-weather work.
Change orders recorded for sub-grade treatment using
undercutting and filling. More changes occurred due to
treatment not satisfying specification requirements.

——

Erosion control was included in the plan but was omitted
in the proposal of pay items.

A less conservative approach was adopted to cut
costs but did not work in this case.

Soil-treatment method should be chosen with
accounting better for site conditions. Engineer also
opined that DCP criterion should be used
comprehensively for QC, with accurate blow count
criteria for specific soils.
Error should have been avoided

In placing backfill material, there was a constructability
issue. Placing aggregate was easier than placing B-Borrow.
Hence B-Borrow was decreased and aggregate included.

A constructability issue which could have been
avoided with better foresight.

Revetment riprap was included for erosion control where
curbs were removed to allow flow of water. Steep areas
needed erosion control.

An issue that could have been avoided with better
knowledge of site conditions.

Two more change orders recorded due to wrong estimation
of aggregate quantities for filling and also for riprap use
along the banks of the river
Subgrade treatment was prescribed in the plans for a
temporary lane needed for traffic regulation. But the
permanent lane in the same area, with same soil had no
subgrade treatment mentioned in plans. A change order
was recorded to treat subgrade for permanent lane.

Miscalculation error should have been avoided.

An issue that should have been considered in the plans.
Records
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TABLE 6.1
(Continued)
Personnel Involved
Project Engineer I

Project Engineer J

Reason for Change Order

Remarks

Constructability issue in flattening of foreslopes required
several change orders. Either right of way was insufficient
for this or the soil was too granular and preventing sliding
of the slope was a challenge. Change orders recorded
for this.

Better knowledge of site conditions could have
prevented related change orders.

Errors in elevations on plans resulted in a few change
orders
——

Errors in elevations on plans should be avoided
as this can result in heavy cost overruns.
General Remarks:
Subgrade issues could be minimized through more
extensive and flexible site investigation programs.
Piling quantities need to match more often with
improved accuracy from test pile driving.
With highway extension, specifications need to account
for conditions where MSE Wall configurations coincide
with pipelines and areas of poor soil.

With respect to specific geotechnical issues that cause
change orders, Consultant A believes subgrade issues
and difference in piling quantities are the most frequent
and susceptible areas for change order occurrence.
Consultant A suggested that such geotechnical change
orders could be prevented through more careful site
investigation through regular site visits, use of aerial
maps, topographic surveys using the latest available
technology and more extensive and calculated borehole
drilling. As far as piling is concerned, he thought that
cost overrun in pipe piles should be relatively less
compared to say, H-piles. He also mentioned that the
method of interpretation of the Standard Penetration
Test (SPT) and Cone Penetration Test (CPT) data
would have to be changed and viewed differently. As
far as the Dynamic Cone Penetrometer criterion goes,
the variations with chemically modified subgrade would
have to be taken into account. He also specified that
there should be a way for the geotechnical consultants
to review their work after construction, to see in
retrospect, how they could have done better with
respect to their recommendations.
Consultant B
Consultant B was of the opinion that the reasons for
geotechnical change orders could not be very different
from those for change orders in any other work in
construction. The very basic reasons for change orders,
according to Consultant B, are time-related change
orders (as time provided for completion of a work
reduces, the work is done much faster and thus greater
the number of change orders), weather-related change
orders (weather is a factor that heavily affects change
orders and this really cannot be controlled or worked
around) and traffic-related change orders (maintenance
of traffic during projects makes things much more
difficult and leads to a lot more change orders being
recorded). More specifically, the two most pressing
issues with regards to geotechnical work, are:

1.

2.

Lack of subsurface information due to boreholes that are
at fixed distances apart and do not accurately capture the
soil profile at all places.
Variation of piling quantities due to selection of a wrong
pile-type for a particular soil type.
Consultant B noted that in Indiana there is a strong
preference for H-Piles due to its strength characteristics.
However, he said the possible unsuitability of H-Piles to
granular soils should also be considered, which is not
done always. However, he also commented that it might
be less expensive in most cases to deal with change orders
rather than perform expensive pile load tests.
Consultant B believes that lack of communication
between design to construction had to be a major reason
for geotechnical change orders. He suggested that
INDOT spent time and effort towards setting up a
fool-proof communication system that left no gaps
between the owners, geotechnical consultants, design
consultants and the contractor. He indicated that many
times what the geotechnical consultants prescribed was
not taken into account by the design consultants and that
what the design consultants recommended was not in the
contract documents. According to him, in many occasions what is there in the contract documents and the
geotechnical report is just unknown to the contractors.
Consultant B also said that the lack of knowledge of site
conditions on the part of the designer may result in
minor glitches in design that cause change orders. He
urged INDOT to have an established system and
corresponding funding mechanism to enable designers
to make more frequent field visits. Consultant B be
mentioned that certain problems are obvious in the field,
but are invisible in the office for the designers to be able
to account for them in their design.

Consultant C
As we have repeatedly noticed in most of the
interviews, Consultant C also emphasized on the
problems of poor soils and mismatch in piling
quantities. The need to identify poor subgrade soils
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and develop a sound methodology for piling quantities
were the issues that needed immediate addressing as
part of controlling geotechnical change orders, stated
Consultant C. He identified the need to perform more
intelligent and diligent site investigation with greater
number of borings. He expressed the need to have a
judgment-based decision on number of borings and pile
driving, rather than going with fixed procedures. He
indicated that the judgment needs to be backed by not
only experience but also by knowledge of conditions in
a particular area, even before any boreholes are drilled.
Consultant C very strongly recommended the need
for a review system on INDOT contracts. This review
system would have to allow geotechnical and design
consultants to thoroughly revisit every part of their
work and gauge their performance based on the events
and quantities that were part of the construction
process. In other words, Consultant C is of the opinion
that geotechnical and design consultants need to be
allowed to review their work by examining how
accurate their recommendations were. He suggested
that, for example, tabular summaries needed to be sent
back to the consultants about the pile driving quantities
that were finally used during construction. By comparing these with their recommendations, the consultants
will then be able to zero in on the errors in their work.
This would help them modify their approach in future
contracts for specific soil types (e.g., underestimations/
overestimations from the PDA testing and the static
and dynamic formulae used for interpreting test results
could be identified and corrected in future projects).
Consultant C also mentioned that with respect to the
subgrade problem, the areas of soil that were eventually
treated, the reasons behind treating them and the
quantities involved could be sent back to the geotechnical and design consultants, so that they could rectify
and remodel their approaches. Also, the contract
information could be reviewed to see where the
discrepancies arose during construction.
Consultant C also had a few other suggestions to
make. He advised that in case of problems during
construction, it might be better for the consultants who
did the work initially to be called up, rather than
INDOT trying to investigate and tackle the problem on
its own. This would help because: a) the consultants
should be in better shape to troubleshoot and tackle the
issue as they performed the initial work, b) the
consultants could learn from their mistakes and help
in rectifying their errors on future projects, c) the
consultants could send back recommendations to
INDOT, which would help the latter tighten its
provisions and specifications, shielding them from
exploitation at the hands of contractors through change
orders. For this, he recommended having an ‘‘openpurchase order for on-call construction problems’’ or
something similar. Even without particular issues to be
handled, Consultant C called for more active involvement of geotechnical and design consultants in the
construction process in order to tackle the problem of
geotechnical change orders.
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In the next section, we summarize all the information
and the important recommendations from the interviews.
6.4. Summary
In this section, we summarize all the important
comments and suggestions that were made by the
project engineers and the geotechnical consultants who
were interviewed. Most of the interviewees mentioned
that they did not see geotechnical problems to be the
main contributor to change orders on projects. Also,
they acknowledged the fact that the variability of soil is
so great that it would be literally impossible to eliminate
geotechnical change orders or point fingers at particular
parties. However, they did recognize the need to
address certain issues. According to the opinions of
the various interviewees, the following were the main
reasons that led to geotechnical change orders:
1.

Failure to identify areas of poor subgrade soil:
It was generally agreed upon that it would be impossible
to identify all areas of poor soil. However, the
interviewees mentioned that this is certainly an issue
that cropped up very frequently and that subgrade
treatment was the item that very often was part of change
orders. Some of the main reasons for a change order
concerning soil treatment were:
a.

Site investigation was not sufficient and problematic
soils weren’t always identified.
b. Quantities were incorrectly calculated because incorrect elevations were given in the plans and, as a
result, more soil than planned had to be treated.
c. The volume of fill that the recycled pavement would
cover was overestimated, when the usage of recycled
pavement for filling undercut portions was prescribed.
d. The prescribed soil treatment method was not the
appropriate one for the particular site conditions.
2.

Mismatch in Piling quantities:
Again, all of the interviewees seemed to concur on the
fact that pile driving quantities from the plan hardly ever
matched the ones used in construction. Some of the
typical reasons for change orders in piling were:
a.

The correct pile type, suited to the soil, was not
chosen in the designs.
b. The PDA tests, test pile driving and the static and
dynamic formulae used for result interpretations
tended to overestimate or underestimate pile quantities.
3.

Erosion control:
In erosion control work, the geotextiles and riprap
quantities mostly overrun as their requirement is underestimated when there is no accounting for site conditions,
such as insufficient right of way or soil drainage
conditions. Quantities for geotextiles and riprap need
to be more accurate as the problem of Errors and
Omissions seems to be widespread in this case.
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4.

MSE wall construction:
According to the interviewees, change orders related to
MSE wall construction are often encountered.
Sometimes, when highways are widened, MSE wall
configurations coincide with the drainage lines that run
just outside the boundary of the existing highways.
Often, the plans don’t account for this problem and the
specifications don’t cover for such an issue either. This
leads to several change orders as the issue is not
considered in the planning stage. Also, ditches by the
side of the old highways are often located in marshy soil,
and plans do not cover for the treatment of soil in such
areas.

Apart from the project specific change orders due to
other reasons, the list above includes some very
frequent reasons for change orders that were identified
by the interviewees. Next, we provide a summary of the
suggestions provided in order to improve on the
geotechnical change order problem in INDOT contracts. The following is a list of suggestions provided by
the various interviewees:
Recommendations for the subgrade treatment problem:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

7.

The site investigation should include a larger number of
boreholes whenever possible. The approach to site
investigation must also be very flexible and should vary
depending on the soil type, the region of the state where
the project is located and the pre-existing knowledge
about the conditions prevalent at the site.
A procedure needs to be devised to calculate accurately
quantities of recycled pavement for use in filling undercut
sections.
Projects that are shelved over an extended period, long
after initial site investigations were completed, need to
have a secondary site investigation to verify that the
conditions have not changed from the time of the initial
site investigation.
There should be increased dependence on experience and
technically-sound analysis and design as opposed to total
dependence on specifications, since experience combined
with quantitative assessments tend to account for specific
conditions characteristic of each site as well as the region
of the state where the project is located.
The method of treatment of poor soils should be selected
based on type of soil.
DCP criteria should be included fully for quality control
in all soils, with the criteria catering uniquely to each soil
type.
On a particular contract, a record of all the areas where
soil was treated and the related quantities need to be sent
to geotechnical and design consultants in order for them
to review their work and assess how accurate their
recommendations were. This would help Consultants in
improving their work for future contracts.

Recommendations for the piling quantities issue:
1.
2.

The pile type needs to be determined based on the type of
soil rather than a preference for a particular pile type.
A tabulated summary of the piling quantities that were
used during construction needs to be sent back to the
geotechnical and design consultants - Since field piling
tests and corresponding formulae tend to provide under

3.

or overestimations, this kind of review would help them to
calibrate their future work based on an assessment of
previous performance.
Better methods for assessment of pile capacity and
interpretation of driving records should be developed so
that in the future, methods that are capable of predicting
pile quantities properly be used by INDOT.

General recommendations to tackle geotechnical
issues causing change orders:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Undistributed quantities could be included in the
contract at the time of bid to cover some expected
geotechnical issues that are highly likely to occur.
Unit prices should be established against other bidders as
these are normally more favorable to INDOT than
establishing a unit price after the letting, with no other
bidders being involved.
A check list could be developed including all possible
problems, which could be used during the design process.
This check list should be developed based on issues that
occur repeatedly for a particular region or soil type or
type of work.
The reason codes should be modified such that assigning
a reason code for a change order is simple and devoid of
any ambiguity - This would help future reference for
determining influential problems causing change orders.
The right attitude towards change orders should be
cultivated among one and all involved in the project.
Apart from making INDOT staff and designers aware of
the risk and cost of change orders, an effort should be
made to develop an ethical understanding with the
contractors.
Specifications need to be more solid in problematic areas
like subgrade treatment and piling, without providing
loopholes for exploitation.
Decisions on the methodology for managing changes
need to be made really quickly because undue delay
generally tends to increase the contract costs heavily.
The interviews helped us obtain a very practical and
detailed view of some of the major issues causing
geotechnical change orders. The suggestions will help
INDOT narrow down on problematic areas, initiate
possible modifications in these areas and also provide a
base for determining methods to eliminate or manage
these problems better. In the next chapter, we will
combine the findings from the data and the interviews to
look at all the results and recommendations in a holistic
manner.

CHAPTER 7. RESULTS AND
DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1. Results
This study analyzed the problem of geotechnical
change orders in INDOT projects through the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Literature review
Agency survey
Data collection and analysis
Interviews with relevant personnel
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7.1.1. Results from the Agency Survey
The agency survey showed the relative standing of
Indiana in comparison with some other states that
provided data for this report (California, Georgia,
Kansas, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Ohio, Virginia,
and Wisconsin). As far as annual construction cost is
concerned, Indiana stood medially in comparison with
the other states that provided data for construction cost.
Based on the results of the agency survey and the results
from the descriptive statistics, the state of Indiana faired
equally or in some years better than a couple of the other
states that provided the geotechnical change order
information for this report. Due to the lack of an
exclusive database to store geotechnical change order
information, several states were unable to provide
relevant data. Compared to the states that provided
geotechnical change order information for this report,
the state of Indiana had about the same or lower
percentages of annual geotechnical change orders. Even
though the percentages seemed nominal, a minor
reduction in change orders, to the extent that this would
be possible, would result in substantial cost savings for
INDOT. Also, through the agency survey, useful
information was garnered regarding the frequent reasons
for the occurrence of geotechnical change orders in
various states. The results from the descriptive statistics
and interviews indicate that the reasons for geotechnical
change orders in other states are, in many cases, the
reasons for geotechnical change orders in Indiana as
well. The most prominent reasons for geotechnical
change orders, as seen in the agency survey, are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Unexpected site conditions due to insufficient site
investigation
Design changes and errors
Changes in field conditions
Presence of man-made buried objects
Variation in contract items – payments and quantities

6.

7.

8.

7.1.3. Results from Interviews
Most of the interviewees mentioned that they did not
see geotechnical problems as the main contributor to
change orders on INDOT projects. Also, they acknowledged the fact that the variability of soil is so great that
it would be literally impossible to eliminate geotechnical
change orders or point fingers at particular parties.
However, they did recognize the need to address certain
issues. According to the opinions of the various
interviewees, the following were the main reasons that
led to geotechnical change orders:
1.

The results from the data analyses were discussed in
detail in Chapter 5. The following are some important
results obtained from the data analyses:

2.

3.
4.

5.
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The average geotechnical change order amount per
district per year was 1.34 percent of the total estimated
construction cost per district per year.
The average geotechnical change order amount per
district per year was 10.25 percent of the average amount
of total change orders per district per year.
The average net overrun due to geotechnical change
orders was $707,000 per district per year.
About 28 percent of the contracts that were considered in
this study experienced geotechnical change orders. Out of
the 300 contracts examined, 84 contracts experienced
geotechnical change orders. In total, 158 geotechnical
change orders were recorded in all the contracts.
Out of the 84 contracts that experienced geotechnical
change orders, there were 64 road contracts, 16 bridge
contracts and 4 resurfacing projects.

Failure to identify areas of poor subgrade soil
It was generally agreed upon that it would be impossible
to identify all areas of poor soil. However, the
interviewees mentioned that this is certainly an issue
that cropped up very frequently and that subgrade
treatment was the item that was very often part of change
orders. Some of the main reasons for a change order
concerning soil treatment were:

7.1.2. Results from Data Analyses

1.

46 contracts (out of the 84 contracts that underwent
geotechnical change orders) experienced only one geotechnical change order, while 24 contracts experienced 2
geotechnical change orders.
About 41% of the total road contracts (155 contracts)
experienced geotechnical change orders. About 37% of
the total bridge contracts (44 contracts) experienced
geotechnical change orders. The other contract types of
this study’s dataset were insignificant as far as geotechnical change orders were concerned.
Out of the 158 geotechnical change orders, Reason code
206 – Constructability: Soils-Related – was assigned to
101 geotechnical change orders. Reason code 405 –
Changed Field Conditions: Soils-Related – was assigned
to 46 geotechnical change orders. Reason code 108 –
Errors and Omissions: Soils-Related – was assigned to
the 11 remaining geotechnical change orders. When
compared to the total number of items that underwent
change due to Errors and Omissions in all change orders
(637), the occurrence of errors and omissions in
geotechnical change orders is relatively low, which is a
positive sign.

a.

Site investigation may not have always been
sufficient, and problematic soils weren’t always
identified.
b. Quantities were incorrectly calculated because incorrect elevations were given in the plans and, as a
result, more soil than planned had to be treated.
c. The volume of fill that recycled pavement would
cover was overestimated in places where use of
recycled pavement, for filling undercut portions, was
prescribed.
d. The prescribed soil treatment method was not the
appropriate one for the particular site conditions.
2.

Mismatch in piling quantities
Again, all of the interviewees seemed to concur on the
fact that pile driving quantities from the plan hardly ever
matched the ones used in construction. Some of the
typical reasons for change orders in piling were:
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a.

The correct pile type, suited to the soil found at the
construction site, was not chosen in the design.
b. For a given pile capacity, the pile length was not
correctly estimated.
3.

Erosion control

4.

In erosion control work, overruns occurred often for
geotextiles and riprap quantities as these were underestimated when there was no accounting for site
conditions, such as insufficient right of way or soil
drainage conditions. Quantities for geotextiles and riprap
were inaccurate due to the problem of errors and
omissions.
MSE wall construction
According to the interviewees, change orders related to
MSE wall construction were often encountered.
Sometimes, when highways were widened, MSE wall
configurations coincided with the drainage lines that ran
just outside the boundary of the existing highways.
Often, the plans did not account for this problem and the
specifications did not cover for such an issue either. This
led to several change orders. Also, ditches by the side of
the old highways were often located in marshy soil, and
plans did not cover for the treatment of soil in such areas.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

7.2. Detailed Recommendations
7.2.1. Recommendations from the Study
Based on the analysis of the data and the interviews
conducted, with various INDOT engineers involved in
the contracts and geotechnical consultants, this study
makes the following recommendations in order to
reduce the occurrence of geotechnical change orders on
INDOT contracts:
1.

2.

The right attitude towards change orders should be
cultivated among one and all involved in any given
project. Apart from making INDOT staff and designers
aware of the risk and cost of change orders, an effort
should be made to develop an ethical understanding with
the contractors.
Since it is seen that contracts with large budgets undergo
more change orders, particular attention needs to be given
at the planning stages, especially for these contracts. The
following measures may be given consideration:
Experts need to be consulted to evaluate risks
accurately and, as appropriate, funds need to be
reserved based on the estimated risk level of the
project
b. Geotechnical work must be allocated time and
financial resources that are consistent with all design
documents.

12.

13.

14.

a.

3.

4.

A check list including all possible problems could be
developed for use during the design process. This check
list should be specifically developed based on issues that
occur repeatedly for a particular region or soil type or
type of work.
The system of reason codes should be modified such that
assigning a reason code for a change order is simple
and devoid of any ambiguity. This would help future

15.

16.

17.

reference for determining influential problems causing
change orders.
The geotechnical report should not only identify all
existing problems but should also discuss the possible
courses of remedy for the issues.
Change orders should be routed through the geotechnical
office so that the designer is made aware of the
occurrence and reason for the change orders.
A clear analysis of all geotechnical specifications needs to
be carried out to identify specifications with potential for
exploitation by contractors.
The geotechnical engineer should coordinate with design
and district construction personnel while making recommendations.
More caution needs to be exercised during the planning
and bidding of road contracts since the data analysis
showed that the road contracts were the most affected by
geotechnical change orders, mainly due to the length of
these projects (change in site conditions are more likely
to occur). Contractual agreements may be introduced to
allocate some risk to the contractor in the case of road
projects.
In road contracts, especially in urban areas, the load
applied by the construction traffic on the bare subgrade
should be accounted for during the design stage.
Possible constructability issues that may arise due to soilrelated reasons need to be better predicted at the
planning stages since the maximum number of geotechnical change orders was due to soil-related constructability issues, as shown by the data analysis. A database
of all constructability issues that occur could be
developed to narrow down and better handle frequently
arising constructability issues. The district, central and
geotechnical office need to get together to perform a
detailed constructability review, prior to letting of major
roadway projects. Especially, traffic regulation and
factors that can affect the quality of subgrade must be
assessed from a constructability viewpoint.
Designers need to be aware of geotechnical foundation
information, especially with respect to conditions below
the subgrade so that they can include relevant items in
the contract documents.
Field conditions need to be more accurately assessed in
order to reduce the number of change orders due to
changed field conditions. More resources may be
allocated towards site investigation for large projects,
with greater level of flexibility in approach and budget.
A flexible approach to site investigation based on soil
type, region of the state, and pre-existing knowledge
about prevalent conditions at a site needs to be taken
whenever possible. Additional borehole-drilling should
be performed wherever preliminary data indicates the
possibility of variable soil conditions – In problematic
areas the preliminary investigation should be followed by
a more rigorous secondary investigation.
Projects that have been shelved over long periods of time
need to have a secondary site investigation performed
before construction starts so that in situ test results
obtained from the preliminary site investigation can be
reevaluated. Specifications need to be devised for doing
this.
The problem of variation in moisture content, between
the time of site investigation and the time of construction, should be tackled.
Borings for rock excavation need to be performed at
accurate locations, to avoid change orders due to varying
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elevations of the rock layer. More effort should be
concentrated towards evaluating the quality of rock, as
there is a tendency to neglect detailed classification of
rock types.
18. More attention must be focused towards determining
piling quantities accurately and suitable research could
be conducted in this area.
19. When anomalies are encountered during construction, a
second geotechnical investigation should be set up and
the district, central and geotechnical offices should get
together to recommend a suitable solution, rather than
direct implementation of specifications in all cases. Also,
the changes due to geotechnical reasons need to be
primarily evaluated by the geotechnical office.
20. An effective software system needs to be developed to
comprehensively record change order information,
immediately after change orders have occurred – This
would help in future assessment of change orders
(Considerable amount of time was lost in this study in
manually creating a dataset from contract documents).

CHAPTER 8. RECOMMENDATIONS
AND CONCLUSION
8.1. Recommendations
In the previous chapter we saw in detail, the
recommendations and inferences from this study. The
following are the main recommendations from this
study in summary:
1.

2.
3.

4.

7.2.2. Recommendations from Interviewees
5.

The following recommendations are some recommendations made by the interviewees:
6.
1.

The following should be kept in mind in order to decrease
the number of change orders associated with subgrade
issues:
a.

The best method of treatment of poor soils should be
selected. This decision should take into account the
types of soils found at the project site. Whenever
possible, DCP criteria specific for each soil type
should be developed and used for compaction
quality control.
b. On a particular contract, a record of all the areas
where soil was treated and of all the related
quantities needs to be sent back to geotechnical
and design consultants in order for them to review
their work and reassess how accurate their recommendations were. This would help consultants
improve their work in future contracts.
2.

The following should be kept in mind in order to decrease
the number of change orders due to issues related to piling
quantities:
The most appropriate pile type for particular soil
conditions must be chosen (the practice of using
mostly a particular pile type for convenience reasons
should be eliminated).
b. A tabulated summary of the piling quantities that
were used during construction needs to be sent back
to the geotechnical and design consultants. This
would help them make adjustments at the planning
stage on future projects.
c. For a given pile capacity, the pile length needs to be
predicted more accurately. Efforts need to be made
to improve the accuracy of analysis of results of
PDA tests that are widely used on INDOT projects.

7.

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

a.

3.
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Specifications need to account for handling of pipelines
and marshy soil that coincide with MSE wall configurations planned during expansion of roads.

14.

15.

The correct attitude of preventing change orders, rather
than dealing with them, needs to be developed among
one and all.
Reason codes for every change order have to be
formulated free of ambiguity.
The geotechnical report must not only identify all
problems but should also provide a discussion of all
possible solutions to the geotechnical issues on the project.
For large projects, site investigation must be extensive
and flexible, suitable to the particular soil type/region of
state, to avoid subgrade treatment problems. In areas of
problematic soil, the preliminary investigation should be
followed by a secondary investigation with more number
of boreholes.
The geotechnical engineer should coordinate with the
design and district construction personnel while making
recommendations.
Change orders related to geotechnical work should be
routed through the geotechnical office so that the
designer is made aware of the occurrence and the reason
for the change orders.
Detailed constructability reviews, with the participation
of the geotechnical office, must be conducted before the
letting of major projects. Especially, traffic regulation
and factors that can affect the quality of subgrade must
be assessed from a constructability viewpoint.
Designers need to be aware of geotechnical foundation
information, especially with respect to conditions below
the subgrade so that they can include relevant items in
the contract documents.
Impact of construction traffic in urban settings, needs to
be accounted for in design.
Variation in moisture content from site investigation to
construction should be accounted for in design.
Specifications need to be evaluated for constructability,
before implementation.
Rock excavations must be accurate and the quality of
rock must be well examined.
Shelved projects need to have a secondary site investigation. Anomalies during construction should also be
sorted out through a second site investigation, with
involvement of the geotechnical office.
More attention must be focused towards determining
piling quantities accurately and suitable research could
be conducted in this area.
An effective software system needs to be used to record
change orders.

8.2. Conclusion
Despite relatively low percentages of geotechnical
change orders reflected by the data analysis and the fact
that interviewees generally felt that geotechnical change
orders were not the major cause for change orders on
most INDOT contracts, a concerted effort should be
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made towards reducing geotechnical change orders.
This would result in significant cost savings for
INDOT. The basic recommendations from this study
would be a good place to start for preventing or
managing geotechnical change orders better.
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